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1
Migration and Remittances
Susan Pozo
Western Michigan University

In the mid-1940s, my father migrated to the United States from
Uruguay. He met and married my mother (a Dominican immigrant) in
New York City and never returned home again while his parents were
living. His contacts with his family were infrequent, consisting only of
a letter or two each year. In contrast to his separation from his family
60 years ago, my one-year sabbatical leave in Uruguay hardly feels so
distant. Thanks to e-mail, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and digital photography, my parents don’t miss a thing, and my husband and I
and our 11-year-old daughter get to keep up with their daily lives, too.
They know the details of each apartment we looked at before deciding
on one, and we get the blow-by-blow on the balcony reconstruction going on at their condominium in Florida. Once a day or so we converse
using Skype, an Internet telephony network, and if they are diligent
about reading my husband’s blog they will even get to see pictures of
the chivitos (a typical Uruguayan sandwich) we ate for lunch today.
While it certainly is not the case that all migrants have the ability to travel with laptops, other aspects of the information technology
revolution, including telephone cards with relatively inexpensive rates
for calling internationally, are widely accessible all over the world. Internet cafes enable even those without regular telephone, electricity, or
Internet service to have access to VoIP. In short, it is much easier for
migrants to keep up with their families back home and for the families
back home to keep up with the absent household member.
Remittances, the earnings that immigrant workers send back home
in cash and in kind, are an important by-product of migration. The
research community has only recently come to recognize the pervasiveness and growing magnitude of these international money flows.
While the measurable growth in money transfers from emigrants to the
families back home is likely due to a variety of factors, including better
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measurement techniques and an increase in the percentage of families
with migrants, I strongly suspect that the ease with which migrants are
now able to maintain contact with family back home is an important
contributing factor to the observed growth and increased persistence of
these flows. In effect, distance is not as great an obstacle for keeping
in touch as it used to be. Those with jobs and earning power in their
adopted homelands are better informed of the needs and desires of family back home. Remittances are less likely to taper off and are more
likely to persist for a longer duration.
This book collects the papers from a yearlong lecture series held at
Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan, on the topic of
international migration, with an emphasis on remittances.1 An overriding theme that emerges from this collection is the need to appreciate the
connection between international migration and remittances in order to
fully understand either migration or remittances. Understanding what
lies behind migration will often provide us with insights on remittances.
But equally important is the need to fully understand the impacts of remittances, as this will provide us with insights about migration.
Some individuals migrate to better their economic standing, others
to diversify the income streams of the family, and still others to reunite
with family in the destination country. Families sometimes flee their
home communities and countries on account of religious or political
persecution. Some migrants leave home with the intention of permanently resettling in the foreign destination, while others migrate on a
temporary basis—to study, to help a relative in need, to accumulate
funds toward purchasing a large-ticket item. Regardless of the reasons
for migrants leaving home, substantial inflows of remittances are common to many regions of the world experiencing emigration. While migration and some of its more obvious effects on the out-migration areas
have been extensively studied, many aspects of these migratory flows
are still poorly understood, including the return flow of money home.
But as the contributors to this book point out, to get the full picture we
need to understand the impact of remittances on the home communities
and on migration in turn. A variety of reasons may explain the absence
of research efforts in the area of international remittances, including
misinformation about the true volume of flows and overly simplistic
models of the motives of migrants who send money home. This book
is intended to fill this void by offering the views of six migration schol-
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ars who came to the WMU campus to share their research in this area
and to offer suggestions for additional efforts toward understanding this
complex process.
The collection begins in Chapter 2 with a general overview of international migration by Robert E.B. Lucas, who notes that almost 10
percent of the population in richer countries is foreign-born, and that
the majority of these foreigners originated in the developing and lowincome world. Poor economic conditions at home are usually presumed
to be the impetus for emigration, and a good deal of attention has been
paid to that motive for migration. While understanding the connections
between poverty and migration can further our understanding of population movements and their effect on the receiving country, Lucas notes
that it is equally important to understand the economic impacts of migration for those areas experiencing out-migration.
Lucas suggests that while economic conditions may explain migration, migration in turn explains economic development back home. Disentangling the two can present a challenge for researchers. Nonetheless,
Lucas discusses how emigration affects the well-being and economic behavior of those left behind. Emigration does so in several ways: through
the remittances that are sent home, through changes in the labor supply
of the remaining household members because of departing members,
through exchange rate impacts, and through their effects on the human
capital levels of the remaining population. Lucas makes clear that in
some of these areas the research community is relatively well versed on
those impacts, but that in other areas a consensus still has not emerged
and we have much to learn concerning the results of out-migration.
Lucas’s chapter brings to the forefront a fundamental point: whether governments acknowledge this or not, the immigration policies of
the in-migration areas can and do significantly affect economic development in the low-income areas of the world. Debates on migration
policy rarely consider the point that differing domestic policies on immigration will have differing consequences for migrant-sending areas
of the world. Although there is little consideration given to this aspect
of migration policy, economists should, at a minimum, provide policymakers with the facts and data that will present options for devising
policies and programs that can lift low-income countries of the world.
A better understanding of the consequences of migration policy should

Pozo Book.indb 3

4/18/2007 10:02:18 AM

 Pozo

increase the odds that policy can be tailored to better benefit out-migration areas.
In this regard it is important that economists recognize the impacts
of differing immigration policies and that they be in a position to inform policymakers of those results when policymakers craft immigration policies. In the book’s third chapter, Oded Stark and C. Simon Fan
provide additional backing for the notion that immigration policies in
high-income areas might have unintended consequences for the outmigration areas.
Stark and Fan note that while it has long been recognized that unemployment in developing countries drives individuals to emigrate so they
can join the labor force in the developed world, the notion that causality
may also run in the other direction has not been adequately considered.
As Stark and others have argued, the prospect of high earnings in the
foreign destination may induce greater investments in human capital.
In other words, rewards to education in the developed world may drive
potential emigrants to spend more time in school and to acquire more
skills, leading to “brain gain” in the developing economy. But what has
not been adequately recognized is that those out-migration probabilities
raise reservation wages (wage expectations) for those seeking to emigrate even while they wait for the opportunity to do so. Given that immigration restrictions in the developed world exist, an excess demand
for visas results. Not everyone who wants to migrate gets to migrate,
and, given the disparities in wage expectations and wage offers, “educated unemployment” persists.
Stark and Fan’s model zeroes in on this educated unemployment
phenomenon as an important channel by which the immigration policies
of high-income countries affect economic conditions in lower-income
areas of the world. Immigration policies that select more-educated immigrants can encourage unemployment in migrant-sending regions of
the world, since such policies raise the supply of the better educated in
areas with few opportunities for those skills. The authors lament that, to
date, rigorous empirical analysis of the complicated interplay between
migrant-sending and -receiving areas has been limited. It is important
that we attempt to follow up on these relationships to better devise policies and to better understand the connection between brain drain and
brain gain.
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While the Lucas and the Stark and Fan chapters focus strictly on
the impacts of migration and policy on the low-income world, in the
book’s fourth chapter Christopher Woodruff looks at the effects on both
nations of traffic crossing back and forth over the border between the
United States and Mexico, which he describes as the “largest unilateral
flow of people (in one direction) and resources (in the other) in the
world.” Woodruff notes that 10 percent of the Mexican-born population resides in the United States—indisputably a massive movement of
people across a national boundary. Equally important, and occurring in
conjunction with this population movement, are the flows of monetary
resources sent by Mexican immigrants in the United States back to their
home communities and families.
Woodruff uses these significant bilateral flows to drive home an
important point concerning the analysis of migration’s impacts on outmigration regions: while it may be tempting to analyze the impacts of
migration simply by comparing the outcomes in households with a migrant to those in households without a migrant, such a comparison is
unlikely to provide us with reliable information on the effects of migration. This is because households that have experienced the migration
of a family member are likely to differ fundamentally from households
that have not experienced the migration of a family member. If we simply compare the two types of households, it will be unclear whether
the differences observed are due to migration or to the underlying, unobserved, unmeasured characteristics that distinguish the two sets of
households in the first place.
In reviewing the measurement issues, Woodruff considers three possible impacts of Mexican migration to the United States: 1) migration’s
impact on business investments in Mexico, 2) its impact on the health
status of children, and 3) its impact on educational attainment.
He points out the pitfalls of using an empirical analysis that ignores the fact that migrant (and remittance-receiving) households are
not randomly selected from the overall population. Instead, he directs
us to appropriate strategies and techniques to compensate for the nonrandomness so that we can properly measure the impacts of migration
and remittances.
Using studies that employ appropriate measurement techniques,
Woodruff concludes that while migration does not seem to induce new
business formation, migration is responsible for substantial investments
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in microenterprises in Mexico. As for its effect on human capital, migration seems to promote educational investments in young children while
decreasing these same investments in older children. Although child
mortality rates are lower in families that have a migrant, researchers
are discovering that migration has a negative effect on specific health
investments that promote healthy outcomes. For example, doctor’s
visits and innoculations may be postponed because of monetary and
other strains arising from the migration of a family member. Woodruff
emphasizes the pains researchers must take to properly measure the
separate impacts of migration and of remittances. He provides us with a
number of methodologies that can be used to overcome these complex
measurement problems.
The fifth chapter in this book concentrates on remittances from the
United States to Latin America. Taking advantage of the wealth of information contained in the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP)
survey, along with the more established Mexico-based survey, the Mexican Migration Project (MMP93), Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes provides
us with a broad, comparative picture of the remittances that flow from
the United States to six Latin American countries—Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, and Mexico. In order to help
the reader better understand these money flows, she discusses what the
surveys reveal regarding who migrates and under what conditions they
migrate to the United States. The surveys rely on information provided
by return migrants. While there are significant differences by country in
the proportion of return migrants who declare to have remitted during
their last U.S. visit, she finds that on average 70 percent of the migrants
claim to have remitted home during their last U.S. visit. They remitted
an average of $300 a month, which was equivalent to 40 percent of their
average monthly earnings.
The MMP93 and the LAMP also collect information on immigration status and on the use of smuggling services to undertake illegal immigration. Such information provides us with insights into the barriers
that confront migrants as well as information on how these barriers are
negotiated. This in turn hints at the likelihood of large monetary obligations incurred back home, which are likely to be reflected in the size of
the remittances sent home: if would-be migrants need to contract for
smuggling services, it is likely that they will have to remit large sums
of money home to pay off those debts and obligations.
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Of particular interest in the chapter by Amuedo-Dorantes is the
cross-country comparison of the end uses of remittances. Considerable
controversy exists regarding the types of expenditures that are undertaken with remittances. Are remittances used by the family remaining
at home to finance consumption, or are they used to save and invest?
The comparative nature of the surveys sheds light on this hotly debated
issue.
In the sixth chapter, David J. McKenzie takes us to another region
of the world, the South Pacific, where he examines another large migratory flow: the flow of Tongans to New Zealand, along with the return flow of New Zealand dollars to Tonga. One-third of Tongans have
emigrated, and remittances account for 39 percent of Tonga’s gross domestic product (GDP). The sheer magnitude of these flows makes the
Tonga/New Zealand case one of interest.
McKenzie uses information from the Pacific Island–New Zealand
Migration Survey (PINZMS), which queries respondents in detail on
the channels used to remit. He supplements this with information he has
collected concerning the costs of sending remittances from a number of
high-immigration countries around the world to small island states. This
permits him a unique perspective on the relative costs and constraints
faced by Tongans remitting money home. In a nutshell, McKenzie finds
that the relative costs for remitting in the case of Tongans residing in
New Zealand are extremely high, and he offers suggestions for policy
that may lead to a reduction in the costs of remitting and thereby increase the volume remitted.
McKenzie comes to several conclusions regarding the longer-term
flow of remittances. He analyzes the relative expectations by remitters and remittees on the future flow of remittances. This information
is crucial to the debate about the long-run impacts of migratory flows
on out-migration areas. Some researchers have expressed concern that
families in out-migration areas learn to depend on the regular monetary
inflows from their family members abroad, letting their own human and
physical capital depreciate. Such a concern would be especially critical
if indeed recipients of remittances expected the monetary inflows to
persist indefinitely. However, because of the nature of the survey, which
matches recipients to senders, McKenzie is able to ascertain expectations regarding the future flows of remittances from the perspective of
both agents. In the long run, both remitters and remittees expect remit-
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tances to decay with time. If remitters do get hooked on remittances, it
is not because they falsely believe that the flows will persist indefinitely. The family at home seems to have reasonably realistic expectations
about how long the flow of money from family members abroad will
continue and to realize that over time the flow will diminish.
The book closes with a thought-provoking chapter by Leah K.
VanWey that includes a typology of migration-remittance systems. The
typology helps us categorize the three types of migration-remittances
systems that are most common: 1) male household heads migrating in
order to remit home with the purpose of supporting a wife and children,
2) children who migrate and send money back home to help parents,
and 3) hometown associations of migrants that collectively remit to
benefit the hometown community. Understanding these variations in
migration-remittance systems enables us to identify the likely impacts
of remittances in the home community, since they help distinguish remittances that are channeled into private consumption versus those that
are channeled into investment and the public good.
Van Wey emphasizes that to truly understand the consequences that
remittances have for migrant-sending communities, it is necessary to
consider in greater detail the institutions that are in place in the home
community, as these ultimately have an impact on remittances. Home
community institutions can exert significant pressures on migrants to
make financial contributions. Understanding the strengths and the pull
of these institutions may give us a more thorough appreciation of the
impacts of migration on economic development.
The chapters in this book all point to the multidimensional ties
that exist between migrants in their adopted homes and the communities from which they originate. Wage disparities, often summarized
as “push” and “pull” factors, certainly help explain migration, but the
process is really much more complicated than that. The monetary flows
that persist beyond the initial migration have significant and lasting impacts on migrant-sending regions of the world. These are important to
account for if we are to truly understand migration and its long-run
effects.
As the world’s information and transportation infrastructure continues to grow, it is likely that emigrants will maintain even closer contacts
with their home communities. The links between migrant-sending and
migrant-receiving areas will likely get stronger. For this reason, now
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is an opportune time to help craft policies that will mold the contribution that immigrants can make both to their adopted and to their home
communities.

Note
1. The series was the forty-second annual Werner Sichel Lecture-Seminar Series,
hosted by the WMU Department of Economics and jointly sponsored by the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and Western Michigan University during the academic year 2005–2006.
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2
International Migration
and Economic Development
in Low-Income Countries
Lessons from Recent Data
Robert E.B. Lucas
Boston University

The links between international migration and economic development of the low-income countries have recently come to attract a good
deal of attention: in 2005 the Global Commission on International Migration (2005) came out with its report, much of which focused on development implications for the low-income countries; the World Bank’s
Global Economic Prospects 2006 was subtitled “Economic Implications
of Remittances and Migration” (World Bank 2005); and in September
2006 the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development took place at the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN).
Why is the migration-development nexus attracting so much attention now? Two key factors go a long way toward explaining the increased interest. First, international migration continues to grow. According to UN estimates, the stock of persons living in a country in
which they were not born expanded by 14 percent from 1990 to 2000.
The breakup of the former Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia accounted
for some of this absolute increase, as internal migrants were suddenly
now counted as international migrants. Most of the rest of the growth
in migration simply reflects world population growth. In fact, migrants
in 2000 remained close to their 1970 portion of world population, at
about 3 percent. But what has really attracted attention is the absolute
expansion in levels of migration to the higher-income countries. By
2000, almost 1 person in 10 in the developed regions was an international migrant. The foreign-born population of the United States grew

11
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by about 13 million during the 1990s, and the number of immigrant
visas issued by the United States in that decade was similar to the number issued during the mass migrations from Europe in the first decades
of the twentieth century. Indeed, immigration to both the United States
and Canada has been on a long-term upward trend since the 1930s. But
the national origins of those migrants are now quite different from those
of earlier migrations to North America; European migrants have given
way to new waves of Asian immigrants, and in the United States, Latin
American migrants have also increased in importance. Meanwhile, Europe faced a flood of asylum seekers arriving during the 1990s. Some
were fleeing from violence on Europe’s edges, such as in the former Yugoslavia, but others came from much farther afield. Recognition rates
of these asylum seekers were low to begin with and fell as more came.
Yet the mass influx, coupled with the fact that the migrants’ countries of
origin had not been common sources of earlier migrants, provoked considerable attention among the European Union (EU) countries, which
had never seen themselves as countries of immigration. Indeed, the EU
member states still do not possess any coherent or mutually consistent
immigration policies.
Besides the increasing numbers of international migrants, the second component that has attracted so much attention among researchers
is the flow of remittances that is now being reported. The World Bank’s
Global Economic Prospects 2006 reports that by 2004 remittances to
the developing regions had grown to nearly US$160 billion (World
Bank 2005). This was about 50 percent greater than all Official Development Assistance.
The link between, on the one hand, this growing interest among researchers, international agencies, and governments in international migration and, on the other, economic development in the lower-income
countries of origin runs both ways: development at home shapes outward migration, while the process of migration simultaneously affects
development in a number of ways. The next section of this chapter turns
first to the former link: the effects of development on outward migration. Most of the rest of the chapter then addresses various aspects of
the latter link: the effect of migration upon development at home.
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The Causes of Migration, and the Effects of
Development upon Migration Pressures
Migration outcomes (i.e., whether individuals are able to migrate)
are a combination of the desire to emigrate and of constraints upon realizing those desires. Various forms of entry controls in the destination
countries represent one obvious form of constraint. Yet these controls
are far from being the only determinant of migration outcomes. The
desire to migrate from a particular country shapes the application rate
for legal entry. Moreover, no country has controls that are absolutely
effective. Despite the militarization of the U.S. borders, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that the number
of irregular migrants in the United States doubled between 1990 and
2000.1 Estimates of the number of irregular migrants in the EU range as
high as 10 million. Similarly, even such countries as Saudi Arabia and
Japan, which have much tighter controls, have significant numbers of
foreigners who have overstayed their visas.
Virtually all of the assembled evidence indicates that the gap in
earnings opportunities for migrants between their home country and
their overseas destination is a significant and important factor in driving migration flows. Thus, economic development at home—provided
that job creation and a tighter labor market accompany this economic
expansion—serves to diminish emigration pressures.
A counterargument has become widely accepted and is featured in
a number of major reports on international migration, namely the concept of a migration hump. The idea is that at low income levels a rise
in incomes serves to exacerbate emigration pressures, while at higher
incomes a drop in income exacerbates emigration pressures. At least
five hypotheses have been put forward as underlying the lower arm of a
migration hump. They are enumerated as follows:
1) Rising incomes result in more rapid population growth, and the
resultant population pressures are the root cause of additional
emigration. Using this hypothesis, Hatton and Williamson
(2002) posit that it was lagged population growth from about
two decades earlier that drove the mass emigrations from Europe in the last century rather than rising incomes per se. On
the other hand, very few countries are now in a phase in which
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population growth is still increasing with development, so this
hypothesis is of less relevance today.
2) Trade liberalization, undertaken in an attempt to accelerate development, can result in temporary job loss, and some of those
displaced may emigrate.
3) A similar claim has been made with respect to the broader
structural transformations (especially the shift from agriculture
to industry) that generally accompany economic expansion.
Note, however, that both of these latter arguments maintain
that it is labor market slack that drives emigration pressures,
which is consistent with the view that gaps in earning opportunities are a major causal factor in migration.
4) Rising incomes at home may ease credit constraints that previously prevented would-be migrants from financing costly migration abroad.
5) It has been suggested that the returns on remittances are higher
in middle-income countries, making emigration and remittance to these states financially more attractive.
Although these hypotheses are all eminently reasonable, and although the notion of a migration hump is now fairly universally accepted, there appears to be little or no systematic evidence to support
this pattern; rather, evidence supports the contrary, that at lower income
levels a rise in incomes serves to relieve emigration pressures, while at
higher incomes a drop in income relieves emigration pressures.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows net annual migration
per thousand of population from 1995 to 2000 for 164 countries. (Negative outcomes reflect net out-migration.) The horizontal axis displays
the natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, measured in purchasing power parity U.S. dollar prices. The two superimposed lines are a simple linear regression line and a spline regression.
The simple linear regression line indicates a significant positive association: lower-income countries tend to have higher rates of net emigration, and higher-income countries exhibit more net immigration. More
importantly, the spline variant clearly shows that the lowest-income
countries do not have very low rates of net out-migration, contrary to
what a migration hump would suggest.
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Figure 2.1 Relationship of Gross Domestic Product to Net Migration for
164 Countries, 1995–2000
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SOURCE: United Nations Development Programme (2002); United Nations Population Division (2003).

Although most existing studies support the notion that emigration
diminishes as income levels and earning opportunities at home improve,
there is considerable noise around this association, as is clear in Figure
2.1. Development is by no means the only factor affecting migration
outcomes: geography is important, too. This is brought out in Figure
2.2, which shows the percentages of each of the non-OECD countries’
populations present in the OECD member states as of 2000.2 First, it is
apparent that there is a great deal of movement among the OECD member countries themselves, very often to neighboring members. Beyond
that, the high emigrations from the Caribbean and Central America
to the United States are evident, as are the large migrations from the
Maghreb, Eastern Europe, and parts of the Middle East to the EU. The
countries with high migrations to the OECD nations from further away
tend to be countries that have spawned large numbers of refugees, such
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Figure 2.2 Non-OECD Country Populations Present in OECD Member States, 2000 (%)
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as Somalia, Angola, and parts of Indochina, though there are exceptions
(such as the Philippines).
In fact, geography seems to be even more important than income
levels and earning opportunities in shaping the migration of low-skilled
workers. Figure 2.3 is similar to Figure 2.2 but shows only the percentages from each country of the adult populations in the OECD with nine
years of education or less. Two aspects of the data in Figure 2.3 are of
particular note. First, some of the OECD member countries are themselves major sources of low-skilled migrants in the OECD. Not surprisingly, large numbers of low-skilled workers are present from Mexico
and Turkey, both of which are OECD members. But other countries,
such as those of southern Europe, are also key sources of low-skilled
workers within the OECD. In fact, 32 percent of the low-skilled migrants in OECD countries are from OECD members other than Mexico and Turkey. The second aspect to note is that very few low-skilled
workers gain access to OECD countries from countries that are distant
from the OECD regions.
Yet this does not mean that countries whose populations are largely
unskilled do not have significant out-migration. Indeed, as the map in
Figure 2.4 shows, a number of countries in low-income regions exhibit fairly high rates of net out-migration even though their stock of
migrants in the OECD is not particularly large. This is a reflection of
the importance of south-south migrations, which often form the dominant option for low-skilled workers from the low-income countries. For
instance, Figure 2.4 shows quite high rates of net emigration from Indonesia, Burkina Faso, and Kazakhstan, though emigration rates from
these countries to the OECD regions are relatively low. Meanwhile,
some of the better-off countries within the developing regions, such as
Malaysia and Gabon, underwent significant net immigration.
A major example of south-south movement has been the mass migrations to the Persian Gulf from South and Southeast Asia as well as
from some of the lower-income countries in the Middle East. Many observers thought this process was coming to an end with the decline in oil
prices in the early 1980s, but in fact there was a resurgence during the
1990s, involving a wider spectrum of source countries. But other, less
well-known movements are important too: from Indonesia to Malaysia;
from large parts of sub-Saharan Africa to South Africa, to Gabon, and to
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Figure 2.3 Non-OECD Country Adult Populations Present in OECD Member States with Nine Years of Education
or Less, 2000 (%)
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other higher-income countries within the region; from Burma to Thailand; from Bangladesh to India; and many more.
Economic development, geography, the incidence of violence, and
many other factors help to shape these complex patterns of migration.
But what are the effects of the migrations upon economic development
at the migrants’ place of origin? What underlies the other half of the
migration-development link?

The Effects of Migration upon
Economic Development
Simulations suggest that there are huge global income gains to be
had even from a small expansion in international migration (Walmsley
and Winters 2003; World Bank 2005). The key to these large gains is the
increases in earnings available to migrants upon moving. Accordingly,
the migrants themselves are the big winners. In practice, part of the
gains to migrants are siphoned off by various middlemen. In particular,
both legal and irregular migrations have become increasingly commercialized, so that recruiters and smugglers now command a significant
fraction of the rents to be had from migration. Indeed, the limited available evidence suggests that the lower the income of the migrant’s country of origin, the higher this rent extraction becomes (Lucas 2005, pp.
275–288). Because the migrants have almost nothing to begin with, the
large gains to be realized in these lower-income contexts give greater
leverage to the middlemen.
It should be emphasized that the net gains to the migrants themselves are a form of economic development for the nationals of the
country of origin, even if these income gains are not drawn from domestic production. The effect of migration upon the incomes of those
left at home is an important one, but the answer to the question of what
kind of an effect it has is generally ambiguous. Although such elements
as tighter labor markets at home and the gains resulting from remittances sent by departed migrants may relieve the economic situation
at home, the potential for effects such as brain drain to act in the opposite direction is very real. One should not expect a uniform answer to
whether emigration helps or hurts those left behind.
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Remittances
Transfers of remittances from migrants may be divided into two
types: those that pass through formal sector intermediaries, versus those
that are transmitted through myriad money dealers in the informal banking network. The latter generally prove cheaper and faster. The official
data on remittances, as reported by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), refer largely to formal remittances, though even these data are
subject to substantial measurement error. Little systematic information
exists on informal transfers, though for some low-income countries informal receipts appear to be relatively large.
The effect of remittances upon people left at home has been the
subject of considerable controversy and some confusion. Other things
being equal, receipt of such transfers must raise the standard of living.
But whether the combined effect of departure of the migrants and receipt of their remittances raises standards of living for those remaining
at home is far less clear. Moreover, whether remittances are spent in
such a way as to accelerate the rate of growth of home-country production is also unclear. Indeed, it is common for researchers to complain
that too little investment occurs out of remittances and even for officials
to direct policy to encourage such investments. Such efforts are largely
misdirected. Officials of the home country may well feel that too little
is being invested in their nation’s economy, yet why the recipients of
remittances should be singled out to undertake the additional investments remains unjustified. Remittances are a private form of income
and should be subject to the same rights and privileges as other forms
of private income. To be sure, artificial barriers to private investments
should be dismantled, but this is true no matter whether these investments are financed out of remittances or otherwise.
The extent to which remittances serve to alleviate poverty in the
home area depends upon the propensity of poor people to migrate, and,
once they have migrated, upon their propensity to remit. In addition, the
indirect effects on poverty alleviation are influenced by the multiplier
effects of remittance spending and by any job creation that occurs as a
result of additional investment coming from the inflow of remittances.
Researchers have devoted most of their attention to remittances’ direct
effect on alleviating poverty. The extent to which current remittances
alleviate poverty through this direct effect seems to be sensitive to how
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one defines the poverty level of families—whether by asset possession
or current earnings—and to whether earnings are defined at the level
they were at before or after the migrant left. Nonetheless there appears
to be relatively uniform agreement that remittance inflows indeed do
alleviate poverty, and in some instances this effect is estimated to be
large.3 The poor do migrate, even internationally, though perhaps more
so internally. The poor also do remit. However, in a number of regions
the very poorest are left out of this cycle of international migration and
remittance receipt.
There is also growing evidence that remittances serve as a key element to ensure smoother consumption patterns for families in low-income countries. Given the vagaries of farming, many families in developing regions see their incomes fluctuate substantially between good
and bad years. Add to this such risks as the family’s main wage-earner
getting ill or a natural disaster occurring, and prospects can be quite
uncertain. A plausible response to these threats is to have some family
members migrate to places where they will be unlikely to meet with the
same misfortune. Then, if disaster does strike back home, the migrant
can support those family members in trouble by remitting. Research has
brought to light several examples of situations where helping to stem a
crisis appears to be reflected in observed remittance patterns.4
Azam and Gubert (2002) note that one can generally expect moral
hazard responses to the insurance provided by remittances. Specifically,
families that receive remittances may well react by reducing their labor
effort at home. This argument is supported by findings in the Kayes area
in western Mali, where household survey data indicate that although
families of migrants have greater agricultural assets, their crop production is actually lower than that of nonmigrant families. Moreover, Azam
and Gubert’s results illustrate that this pattern is not simply a result
of a smaller number of family workers available at home following
the departure of migrants, nor a reflection of families with lower productivity tending to have members that migrate more. Certainly these
findings are consistent with a growing body of literature demonstrating
that, upon receipt of remittances, families enjoy part of the rise in living
standards in the form of additional leisure.5
A second impact of remittances upon the labor market at home may
also be noted. To the extent that remittances provide a sufficient amount
of foreign exchange to support the exchange rate, they also make ex-
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porting more difficult. This effect, which is sometimes referred to as the
“Dutch disease” effect of remittances, can serve to limit employment
creation in the export sector, potentially leading to greater pressures to
emigrate.6
Labor Market Impacts at Home
Apart from the effects of remittances through moral hazard in labor
supply and through the exchange rate upon employment creation, the
departure of migrant workers can readily affect the labor markets at
home more directly. The withdrawal of migrants typically will either
put pressure on home country wages to rise or will at least shorten the
queue for jobs, depending upon whether or not the market has a labor
surplus. More generally, migration’s overall impact on the home country’s labor market will also depend upon the extent of internal migration
induced to replace departing workers and upon the skill mix of those
migrating. A key element is whether the skills possessed by emigrants
are complements or substitutes for the skills of those who remain at
home. For example, the departure of highly skilled workers could raise
the earnings of their direct competitors at home yet lower the demand
for less-skilled workers who would have worked alongside those departing migrants in ancillary positions (Davies and Wooton 1992).
Rather surprisingly, although the issue of immigration’s impacts on
the labor market has been the subject of extensive research, the issue
of emigration’s impacts upon labor markets in countries of origin remains largely neglected. Certainly no generalizations appear possible
at this juncture.7 Nonetheless, how the home country’s labor market
performs for highly skilled persons proves central to determining how
much damage is done by the brain drain.
Brain Drain, Brain Gain, and Brain Overhang
Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of each country’s tertiary educated
population residing abroad in an OECD country in 2000.8 Although this
percentage omits emigration of the highly skilled to non-OECD countries, on which no systematic data exist, Figure 2.5 nonetheless offers
a good picture of the incidence of the brain drain flowing from developing to industrialized regions. Particularly high rates of brain drain

Pozo Book.indb 23

4/18/2007 10:02:54 AM

Pozo Book.indb 24
4/18/2007 10:03:07 AM

<2
<5
<10
>10

SOURCE: Docquier and Marfouk (2005).

24 Lucas

Figure 2.5 Tertiary Educated Population of a Country Residing Abroad in an OECD Country, 2000 (%)
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are observed from Central America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe,
parts of the Middle East and Indochina, and across almost the whole of
Africa.
North America, and the United States in particular, is the principal destination for these highly skilled migrants. European firms have
only recently joined the race to attract the highly skilled, and Europe’s
foreign population is dominated by lower-skilled workers. Even the
exodus of highly skilled professionals from Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (consisting of 11 former Soviet
republics) occurred mostly to the United States during the 1990s, not to
neighboring Western Europe.
Do the low-income countries lose from this departure of their most
talented and highly educated? Chief among the potential sources of
harm commonly cited are the following three types of loss: 1) the loss
of economic growth, since such growth generally correlates with the
presence of educated persons; 2) the loss of external benefits (such as
better governance) that come with the presence of highly skilled compatriots; and 3) the loss of public funds invested in the highly skilled,
as well as the loss of funds that would be taxed from their incomes at
home. Each of these losses is controversial. Although the presence of
highly skilled people is correlated with faster growth and with various beneficial outcomes such as the aforementioned better governance,
whether this presence is the causal factor remains in dispute. Moreover,
if there are any benefits, the question of whether the highly educated
themselves reap the lion’s share of these benefits in the form of higher
incomes remains untested. And whether the highly educated make a
net contribution to the fiscal balance is also contentious, since public
spending on the highly educated and their families is often greater. On
the other hand, the loss of public funds invested in the highly educated
is much clearer in countries that heavily subsidize higher education of
even the children of elite families.
A separate but closely related aspect of these potential losses is
countries’ inability to deliver key social services, such as health care
and education, without trained personnel. The mass recruiting of health
care workers from Africa has attracted particular criticism in the face
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic there, not to mention malaria and other diseases that ravage the continent. Yet it is not clear that the emigration
of doctors and nurses from Africa is the main constraint on the ability
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of African states to offer better health care (Clemens 2006). Indeed,
across the spectrum of professions and in all developing regions, the
inefficient use and allocation of the highly skilled classes raise serious
doubts about the real costs imposed by their departure—a feature that
might be called “brain overhang.”
But many observers go even further, claiming that emigration of
the highly skilled can confer benefits on their country of origin through
the activities of a professional diaspora, which has become known as
“brain gain.” The best documented of these arguments is that a diaspora
may have a beneficial effect on promoting trade with the home country;
it does this by its members improving the flow of information between
the home and the destination countries and by their ability to enforce
contracts (Rauch 2001). For example, it seems the presence of Indian IT
professionals in this country was critical to expanding India’s software
exports to the United States (Saxenian 2004). Other routes that can lead
to beneficial effects and are commonly cited, but far less well documented, involve the transfer of technology and the promotion of direct
investments in the home country.
However, the aspect of brain gain that has perhaps attracted the most
attention recently is the inducement to expand education at home. The
idea is that the emigration opportunity afforded by higher education
induces greater college enrollments, and that only a fraction of those
thus attracted to continue their education will actually manage to leave
the country. If the stock of the highly educated population left at home
thus expands, domestic production may then be improved (Mountford
1997; Stark and Wang 2002). Some observers may express reservations
about this: the expansion of home education is hardly costless, and the
freshly attracted students may be less competent, for instance (Schiff
2005). But perhaps more importantly, the evidence across countries
does not seem to support this hypothesis, though certainly in some specific countries (such as the Philippines) enrollment in higher education
indeed appears to be quite sensitive to overseas opportunities (Lucas
2005, Box 4.1).
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Summing Up: Policies and Prospects
The effects of emigration upon economic development for those
remaining at home are mixed. The effects are typically more povertyalleviating, and possibly more positive for development in general, in
cases where migrants are drawn from the lower-skilled parts of the labor force. It also tends to be true that the effects upon incomes of those
remaining at home are more positive when the return rate (or at least
the intended return rate) of migrants is higher. For instance, the massive
remittances resulting from migration to the Persian Gulf are largely a
reflection of the enforced family separation and the temporary nature of
these movements.
Virtually none of the high-income countries really think of their
migration policies as part of a more coherent development policy for
the lower-income regions. Indeed, the competition among firms in the
high-income countries to attract the best and the brightest from the developing regions is heating up: an ever-increasing number of industrialized countries are actively recruiting foreign students, often with the
express intent of keeping the most successful. Meanwhile, almost all of
the high-income countries have in place massive agricultural subsidies
and protect low-skilled manufacturing activities. Both agriculture and
manufacturing employ irregular migrants from the developing regions.
However, the low-skilled workers thus brought to the OECD countries tend to come from nearby nations that are not among the lowest-income countries. In fact, the force of geography is such that the propensity of countries to send their low-skilled workers to the OECD regions
rises significantly with the income level of the originating country.
Temporary migrations of low-skilled workers probably have the
biggest impact on poverty reduction in the developing regions of any
type of migration. Most high-income countries seem to prefer temporary migrants to permanent ones and have expanded several of their
temporary migration schemes. Yet such schemes face a fundamental
dilemma: attempts to integrate migrants, to promote their rights, and
to enable family reunification all tend to discourage return migration.
On the other hand, the family and social costs can be high from government approaches to temporary migration that prevent legal family
accompaniment.
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What we probably need to seek are better ways of managing such
temporary migrations. Certainly a number of steps seem eminently feasible to encourage greater return rates. Extending Mode 4 of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to encompass low-skilled services may be one such critical step.9 Establishing transferability of pension schemes to the home country is another. The use of intermediary
contracting of projects appears to be particularly effective in ensuring
that migrants return home, though such schemes need closer regulation
to prevent abuse of the contract workers.10 Ironically, irregular migrants
are discouraged from returning home when the prospect of recrossing
the border becomes more formidable.
In practice, only a few developing countries actually have very high
emigration rates to the industrialized nations. Distance deters migration,
both internally and internationally (Lucas 2001). Social networks help
to amplify migration streams, once initiated. The combined effect is
that remote countries, and remote villages within countries, are left out
of the migration process. Where migration is never initiated, the community becomes increasingly isolated from a growing migration flow,
both internally and globally, and pockets of poverty remain there. Yet
south-south migrations often present migration opportunities of shorter
distance, and consequently in today’s setting they may represent the
most important vehicles of poverty relief through migration from the
lowest-income countries.
This picture could change. Communications, transportation, and
commercialization of movement are all increasing. Moreover, the demographic map will shift dramatically over the coming decades. Most migrants are young adults, typically ages 15–30. By far the fastest growing
populations in this age range are in sub-Saharan Africa (Lucas 2006).
The world may well witness a rapid Africanization of international migration in the next half century—not just within the African continent,
which is the dominant pattern at present, but out of Africa too.

Notes
1. On March 1, 2003, the INS was relocated from the Department of Justice to the
Department of Homeland Security and split into three agencies: the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Bureau of Customs and Border Pro-
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2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

tection, and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Irregular”
migrants are undocumented or illegal migrants.
The OECD, or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, is composed of 30 market democracies and is dedicated to helping governments tackle
the economic, social, and governance challenges of a globalized economy.
See, for example, Tingsabadh (1989) on Thailand, Gustafsson and Makonnen
(1993) on migration of Lesotho’s mine workers to South Africa, Lachaud (1999)
on Burkina Faso, Adams and Page (2003a) on North Africa, and Adams (2005)
on Guatemala, plus Adams and Page (2003b) for more global evidence.
See Lucas and Stark (1985) on Botswana, Hoddinott (1992, 1994) on western
Kenya, Brown (1997) on Pacific Island migrants, Schrieder and Knerr (2000) on
Cameroon, Gubert (2002) on the Kayes areas of western Mali, and Quartey and
Blankson (2004) on Ghana.
See Funkhouser (1992) on Nicaragua, Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) and Yang
(2004) on the Philippines, and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) on Mexico.
For an early discussion of this point, see Quibria (1997). The Economist coined
the term “Dutch disease” in 1977 to describe the manufacturing sector’s decline in the Netherlands after natural gas was discovered in the North Sea in
the 1960s. Deindustrialization followed because the discovery of this natural
resource raised the value of the Dutch guilder, making manufactured goods less
competitive with those of other nations, thus increasing imports and decreasing
exports.
For a review, see Lucas (2005, pp. 85–102).
See also Dumont and Lemaître (2004).
In GATS, a treaty of the World Trade Organization, Mode 4 deals with the international movement of people in the process of delivering international trade in
services.
“Contracting” here refers to a firm taking on a project abroad and bringing workers from abroad to execute this project.
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There are two salient features of many writings on human capital
in developing countries. First, a fraction of the educated workforce migrates to developed countries. Since educated workers are one of the
scarcest resources in developing countries, it has been argued that the
migration of educated workers is a “brain drain” for the developing
countries.1 Second, in a number of developing countries, a large fraction of the educated workforce is unemployed. For example, in their influential development economics textbook, Economics of Development,
Gillis et al. (1996) allude to the Sri Lankan experience as a striking example, noting that half of the country’s new university graduates were
unemployed in the 1970s.2 The phenomenon of educated unemployment in those developing countries contrasts sharply with the pattern
of unemployment in developed countries. In the latter, the unemployment rate and educational attainment are strongly negatively correlated
(Ashenfelter and Ham 1979).
However, while there has been extensive research on the brain
drain,3 the issue of “educated unemployment” has attracted little attention in the economics literature, despite references to its importance in
development economics textbooks. A notable exception is an article by
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). In a fixed-wage framework, Bhagwati
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and Hamada argue that a high foreign wage can increase the fixed wage
rate of the educated in the home country by affecting people’s psychology and that, in turn, the higher fixed wage increases unemployment.4
However, since educated unemployment is not a serious problem in
all of the developing countries, Bhagwati and Hamada could not explain why a high foreign wage affects the psychology of people in some
countries but not in others.
This chapter provides an alternative model of educated unemployment. In the model developed here, educated unemployment is caused
by the prospect of international migration, that is, by the possibility
of a brain drain. In a simple job-search framework we show that an
individual’s reservation wage in the labor market of the home country
increases with the probability of working abroad. Consequently, workers who fail to line up employment abroad are less likely to immediately immerse themselves in work in their home country. Instead, they
enter unemployment in order to engage in a repeated attempt to secure
foreign employment. Thus, we provide a new explanation for the phenomenon of educated unemployment observed in developing countries.
Our theoretical analysis provides a basis and a rationale for rigorous
empirical tests of this important phenomenon—tests that, to the best
of our knowledge, are absent in the received literature. Moreover, our
main argument that international migration and educated unemployment are closely linked seems to be consistent with considerable anecdotal evidence and policy-related research.5
We integrate the educated unemployment–international migration
perspective with the recent literature on the “beneficial brain drain,”6
which contends that compared to a closed economy, an economy open
to migration differs not only in the opportunities that workers face but
also in the structure of the incentives that they confront: higher prospective returns to human capital in a foreign country impinge favorably
on human capital formation decisions at home. The analysis contained
in this chapter shows that a developing country may end up with more
educated workers despite the brain drain and educated unemployment. In other words, the average level of human capital in the country
may well be higher under migration than in the absence of migration.
This higher level can play a positive role in determining long-run future output growth, the present-day gloom of educated unemployment
notwithstanding.
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The next two sections of this chapter, “Migration and educated unemployment” and “The choice of acquiring higher education,” set up
the basic analytical framework and present a model of educated unemployment. The fourth section presents an analysis demonstrating that
the prospect of international migration can lead to a “brain gain” despite brain drain and the possibility of being unemployed after acquiring a higher level of education. The final section offers conclusions and
complementary reflections.

Migration and educated unemployment
Consider a world that consists of two countries: home, H, and foreign, F. Country H is developing and is poorer than country F, which
is developed. Because of a policy of selective migration by F, only educated individuals (say, university graduates) of H have a chance of
working in, hence migrating to, F.
In this section we analyze the behavior of the home country’s educated individuals. In the next section we incorporate into the model the
cost of education and we analyze the decision to acquire education.
For our purposes, we assume that everyone in H is educated. The
decision-making process of an educated individual is illustrated by Figure 3.1. According to this model, an educated individual makes decisions in (at most) three stages:7
The first stage. When an individual graduates from a university in
H, the individual participates in a lottery draw that results in probable
work in F. If the individual obtains a winning ticket, his income will be
w f. The probability of being selected to work in F is p.
The second stage. (Note that there is no second stage for individuals who win the draw.) An individual who graduates and fails to secure
work in F faces the following choices: to work or to wait for another
draw. Waiting for another draw frees up time to search for a job in F.
Alternatively, if the individual were to work, little time (and energy)
would be available for preparing applications and, in addition, the indi-
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Figure 3.1 Stages in the Decision-Making Process of an
Educated Individual
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Figure 1: Stages in the decision making process of an
educated individual
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vidual’s academic qualifications could depreciate, thereby lowering the
probability of being picked up for work in F.8
The assumption that individuals choose unemployment while waiting for another draw of going abroad is particularly consistent with the
job-search theory. In fact, the assumption that the probability of finding
a (new) job is higher when an individual does not hold a job, but instead concentrates on searching for a job, is at the heart of the literature
on job search and the natural rate of unemployment (Mortensen 1986;
Acemoglu and Shimer 1999; Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright 2005). The
rationale underlying this assumption is that searching for a job requires
time and effort. The received job-search theory refers to domestic markets. It is reasonable to assume that finding a job in a foreign labor
market requires even more time and effort.9
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that if the individual works, he
cannot participate in any additional draw, so his probability of ending
up working in F is zero. If the individual does not work and awaits another draw, his chances of going abroad are p'.
The third stage. (Note that the third stage only applies to those who
waited for another draw in the second stage.) If an individual wins this
draw, he will go abroad. Otherwise, he will work at home, receiving the
home country’s mean wage rate.
The job offers in the second and third stage follow an independently
identical distribution. The cumulative distribution function of the wage
offer, w,
˜ is F(w). We assume that F(w) is differentiable. We also assume
that
l
, wh]
w∈[w
˜
and that the density function,
dF(w)
  dw

≡ F'(w) ,

is strictly positive in its domain, that is,		
F'(w) > 0 ∀w∈[wl,wh] .
The expected income of the (risk-neutral) individuals in the third
stage is
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(3.1)

_
(1 − p')w + p'w f ,

_				
where w is the mean wage in H, namely
       _ wh
w = ∫wl wdF(w) .
In the second stage, if the individual receives a wage offer w at H,
he will accept it if and only if
(3.2)

w>

_
1		
[(1 − p')w + p'w f ] ,
1+r

where r is the individual’s discount rate.
We define
(3.3)

wc ≡

_
1		
[(1 − p')w + p'w f ] .
1+r

In this case, the individual will accept the wage offer at H if and only if
w > wc. Thus, wc is the individual’s reservation wage at H.
Further simplifying, we assume that
(3.4)

wl ≥

1 _
w;
1+r

educated unemployment will not exist in the absence of an additional
possibility of migration (that is, when p' = 0).10
Then, the fraction of the educated who are unemployed11 is
(3.5)

u ≡ P (w˜ ≤ wc) = F(wc) .

Clearly,
(3.6)

du du  dwc
=
dp'   dwc dp'

_
wf − w
.
= F'
			
1+r
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Note that the assumption
_ that F is developed and H is developing naturally implies that w f > w. Since F' > 0 ,
(3.7)

du
>0.
dp'

In addition, we note that
_
_
1 [w
+ p' (w f − w)]
wc ≡
1+r
and that
(3.8)

p'
du   _
= F'
>0.
1+r
d(w f − w)

In summary, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: 1) The unemployment rate of university graduates
in a developing country will increase as the probability of migration
rises. 2) The unemployment rate of university graduates in a developing
country will increase as the wage gap between the developed country
and the developing country increases.
Proposition 1 implies that in a developing country, educated unemployment is caused by the prospect of international migration, that
is, by the possibility of a brain drain. The greater the probability of being selected for work in the foreign country and the greater the wage
gap between the foreign country and the developing country, the more
serious the educated unemployment problem. The intuition underlying
the proposition is straightforward. From Equation (3.3) we can_ see that
wc increases with p' and with w f, and that it decreases with w, which
means that the individual’s reservation wage in the home labor market
increases with the probability of working abroad and with the international wage gap. Consequently, the unemployment rate will increase as
the reservation wage rises.
Moreover, we have assumed for the sake of simplicity that only
educated individuals (say, university graduates) of the home country
have a chance of working in, hence migrating to, the foreign country. If
we modify this assumption slightly, so that a better-educated individual
in a developing country faces a higher probability of working abroad,
then by similar logic to Proposition 1, we will obtain the result that the
unemployment rate is higher for individuals with higher education.

Pozo Book.indb 39

4/18/2007 10:03:11 AM

40 Stark and Fan

The choice of acquiring higher education
The benefit that education without_migration confers is simply H’s
mean wage rate of educated workers, w. When migration is a possibility, the expected payoff from the three stages described in the preceding
section is						
_
			
wh
p'w f +(1 − p')w
f
c
(3.9) V ≡ pw + (1 + p) ∫wc wdF(w) + F(w )
         


1+r

				
wh
= pw f + (1 − p) ∫wc wF'(w)dw + F(wc)wc .


Clearly,
					
c
dV
c
c
c
c
c dw
(3.10)
=
p
+
(1
−
p)
−F'(w
)w
+
F'(w
)w
+
F(w
)

 dw f
dw f
					
p'
>0.
= p + (1 − p)F(w c)
1+r
Let us assume that
(3.11)

p' = p(1 + α) ,

where α is a fixed parameter. To ensure that 0 < p' < 1, we assume that
−1 < α <

1
−1.
p

Then,
wh
dV
= w f − ∫wc wdF(w) + F(w c)w c
dp
_
						
(w f − w)(1 + α)
c
c
c
c
c
(3.12)
+ (1 − p) −F'(w )w + F'(w )w + F(w )
1+r
		
             _
wh
(w f − w)(1 + α)
.
= w f − ∫wc wdF(w) + F(w c)w c + (1 − p)F(wc)
							
1+r

We further assume that
(3.13)
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To rule out the unreasonable possibility that all the educated are unemployed, we assume that
w c < wh .

(3.14)

It follows that
wh

		 ∫wc wdF(w) + F(w c)w c
                   wh

≤ ∫wc w hdF(w) + F(w c)w h
wh

= wh∫wc dF(w) + F(w c)w h
= wh[F(wh) − F(wc)] + F(wc)wh
= wh .
Therefore,
(3.15)

w f > ∫wc wdF(w) + F(w c)w c ,
wh

and it then follows from Equation (3.12) that
(3.16)

dV
>0,
dp

that is, the benefit of acquiring a university education in H increases as
the probability of migration rises.
We next incorporate the cost of acquiring education. Our idea is
that individuals differ in their abilities and familial background, hence
in their cost of acquiring education. We normalize the size of the (premigration) population of H to be Lebesgue measure 1. Suppose that an
individual’s cost of obtaining education, c, follows the uniform distri.
bution c∈[0,Ω]
˜
We assume that the (lifetime) income of an uneducated individual
is constant, and we denote it by Φ. Then, recalling the assumption that
only individuals with university degrees have any chance of migrating,
we see that an individual will choose to acquire a university education
if and only if
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(3.17)

V−c≥Φ.

Let us define
(3.18)

c* = V − Φ .

It follows that an individual will obtain a university education if and
only if his cost of education maintains
c ≤ c* .
Since c˜ follows a uniform distribution and the population size of the
economy is of Lebesgue measure 1, both the proportion and the number
of educated individuals are given by
(3.19)

c*
.
Ω

From Equation (3.18) we get
(3.20)

d(c*/Ω) 1 dV  
=
>0,
dp
Ω dp

where the inequality sign in Equation (3.20) follows from Equation
(3.16). We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 2: The number of individuals undertaking university
education will increase as the probability of migration rises.
This proposition implies that while the prospect of migration causes
the unemployment rate of educated individuals in the home country to
increase (Equation [3.7]), it also induces more individuals to acquire
education (Equation [3.20]). The end result may be an increase in the
number of unemployed university graduates. Thus, Propositions 1 and
2 provide an explanation for the phenomenon of educated unemployment by linking it to migration.
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A brain drain versus a brain gain
In this section, akin to Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997,
1998), we seek to examine whether the prospect of migration can result in a larger number of educated individuals in the home country.
Since in our model only educated individuals have a positive probability of migration, it follows that if the prospect of migration results in a
larger number of educated individuals in the home country, then it will
a fortiori result in a higher fraction of educated individuals in the home
country.
The following proposition shows that the brain gain caused by the
prospect of migration may be larger than the loss from the brain drain.
Proposition 3: There exists a positive level of p at which the number
of university graduates remaining in the developing country is higher
than the number of university graduates
_ in the developing country when
p = 0 , for any given α , if w f > (3 + α)w .
Proof: We first note that c* is a function of V and hence of p, so we
define it as
(3.21)

c* ≡ c(p) .

Then, under the migration prospect, the number of university graduates
remaining in the developing country is
(3.22)

c(p)
c(p)
c(p)
+ (1 − p) p'
F(wc)
− p
Ω
Ω

 Ω
= c(p)(1 − p)(1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)) /Ω .

Let us define
K(p) c(p)(1 − p)[1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)] c(0)
− Ω ,
Ω ≡
Ω
so that
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als in the home country when p > 0, and the number of educated individuals in the home country when p = 0.
Since
K(p) ≡ c(p)(1 − p)[1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)] − c(0) ,
we know that
K(0) = 0
and that
K'(p) = c'(p)(1 − p) [1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)]
_
						
(w f − w)(1 + α)
− 1 − p(1 + α)F(wc) + (1 − p)(1 + α) F(wc) + pF'(wc)
c(p) .



1+r
						
We seek to show that K'(0) > 0 which, by the continuity of K(p),
would imply that K(p) > K(0) in the small (positive) neighborhood of
p = 0. Note that
K'(0) = c'(0) − [1 + (1 + α)F(wc)]c(0) .
When p = 0, we know from the assumptions in Equations (3.4) and
(3.11) that educated unemployment will not exist in the absence of an
additional possibility of migration, which implies that wc = wl. Then,
from the last line of Equation (3.12) and from the consideration that
F(wl) = 0, we get					
_
f
                         
wh
dV
(w
−
w)(1
+ α)
c
c
f
c
│p=0 = w − ∫wc wdF(w) + F(w )w  + (1 − p)F(w )
1+r
dp

_

(w f − w)(1 + α)
= w − ∫wl wdF(w) + F(w )w  + (1 − p)F(w )
1+r
				
_
(3.23)
= wf − w .
f

wh

l

l

                         

l

Also, from the equality in Equation (3.20) , we know that
dc* dc(p) dV .
=
=
dp        dp       dp
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Therefore,
				
_
dc(p)
dV  
f
p=0 = c'(0) =
p=0 = w − w .
dp
   dp
			
_
When p = 0, V = w . Hence, from (3.18) and the definition c* = c(p),
we get

|

(3.24)

|

c(0) = V
_−Ф
=w−Φ.

Thus, K'(0) > 0 if and only if
(3.25)

_
_			
w f − w −[1 + (1 + α)F(w c)](w − Φ) > 0 .

Since
1 + (1 + α)F(wc) < 2 + α ,
Equation (3.25) will be satisfied if
_
_
w f − w − (2 + α)(w − Φ) > 0 ,
that is, if
_
(3.26) w f > (3 + α)w − (2 + α)Φ .
						
_
And since Φ > 0, it follows that when w f > (3 + α)w, Equation (3.26)
will be satisfied, in which case we will have the result that
K'(0) > 0.
Hence, by the continuity of K(p), it must be that K(p) > K(0) in the small
(positive) neighborhood of p = 0. ■
Proposition 3 shows that a developing country may end up with
more university graduates despite the brain drain of university graduates. If we consider that there is a reduction of the population in the
wake of migration, the proposition also implies that the developing
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country may end up with a higher fraction of educated individuals, despite the brain drain of university graduates.
Combining Propositions 1 and 3 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1: A positive level of educated unemployment in a developing country coexists with a larger number of university graduates
in the country than the number of university graduates
in the country
_
under no educated unemployment if w f > (3 + α)w.
Since there are fewer individuals in the country under feasible migration, and since there are more educated individuals in the country
under feasible migration, it must follow that the average level of human
capital in the country is higher under migration than in the absence of
migration. This higher level can play a critical role in determining longrun output growth, an issue to which we will turn in a future work.

Conclusion
Since the late 1960s, the development economics literature has
pointed to a stark connection between migration and unemployment:
workers change their location, but not their productive attributes, in
response to an expected wage at destination that is higher than their
wage at origin, only to end up unemployed (Todaro 1969). We propose
a different connection between migration and unemployment wherein
workers move into unemployment at origin in response to an expected
wage at destination, and workers improve their productive attributes.
While the flight of human capital and the unemployment of human capital occupied the center stage of development economics at about the
same time (the 1970s), analysts and policymakers did not make a causal
connection between the two phenomena except for noting that unemployment induced a desire to migrate. Our analysis considers a link: in a
simple job-search framework, we show that an individual’s reservation
wage in the home labor market increases with the probability of working abroad. Thus, our model implies that such unemployment would
be smaller in the absence of the migration possibility. Furthermore, we
integrate our model into the recent literature of beneficial brain drain.
The analysis shows that a developing country may end up with more
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educated individuals despite the brain drain and educated unemployment. Our theoretical analysis provides a basis and a rationale for rigorous empirical tests of the link between international migration and
educated unemployment, which are absent in the received literature.
Such empirical endeavors will constitute an interesting topic for future
research.

Notes
We are grateful to Gordon Hanson and to an anonymous referee for helpful advice,
enlightening comments, and constructive suggestions. Financial support from the Humboldt Foundation, the Sohmen Foundation, and the International Centre for the Study of
East Asian Development is gratefully acknowledged.
1. For a systematic review of this argument see Bhagwati and Wilson (1989).
2. Also, Mathew (1997) reports that in urban Kerala, India, in 1983, the unemployment rate of university graduates was 11.34 percent for males and 25.69 percent
for females, which is much higher than the unemployment rate of those who
had no education (3.52 percent for males and 1.52 percent for females) and than
the unemployment rate of those who had up to primary education (6.73 percent for males and 8.43 percent for females). More recently, Bourdarbat (2004)
shows that in 2000, the unemployment rate of university graduates in Morocco
was about four times that of individuals who had acquired less than six years of
schooling.
3. The topic of the brain drain is also regularly taken up in the informed press (see
the short overview in Stark [2004]).
4. For example, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, p. 20) state, “The presence of international income-inequality implies that, for the educated elite which is better
informed about the developed world, and more integrated therewith regarding
the notions of a ‘good life’ and related values, the salary levels demanded and
fixed by the elite groups tend to reflect the salary levels of comparable groups in
the more developed countries.”
5. For example, see King (1987) and Tullao (1982).
6. For example, see Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998); Mountford
(1997); and Stark and Wang (2002).
7. We assume that relative to the duration of the individual’s working life, the duration of the three stages is short.
8. Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) show that “working experience in the source
country yields virtually no return in the host country.”
9. Information on the employment status of migrants at home in developing countries prior to migration is scanty. Rudimentary studies suggest that on several
occasions, nearly half of the migrants from India were unemployed prior to migration (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003). Additional empirical work on the em-
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ployment status of individuals prior to their international migration would be of
considerable interest.
10. Although this assumption is not necessary, resorting to it highlights the notion
that educated unemployment is caused by the prospect of migration.
11. Note that in the current model, to facilitate our concentrating on essentials, unemployment applies only to stage 2 of the individuals’ decision-making processes.
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4
How Does Migration
Affect Local Development?
What Mexico’s Experience Tells Us
Christopher Woodruff
University of California, San Diego

Close to 200 million people live in a country other than that of their
birth. Driven by large differences among countries in the wage rates
paid to workers, the number of migrants worldwide continues to grow
by about 3 percent a year. The largest share of these migrants move
from developing to developed countries and have low to moderate education levels. A recent World Bank report (2005) estimates that in 2005
migrants returned $167 billion to their countries of origin.1 Remittance
flows have increased even more rapidly than migrant flows in recent
years. According to the World Bank data, remittances more than quintupled between 1990 and 2005, an annual growth rate of 12 percent.
The amount of remittances is now comparable to the flow of foreign
direct investment and is about twice the size of foreign aid flows (World
Bank 2005).
The 10 million Mexican migrants in the United States represent
about 5 percent of the world migrant total. The $20 billion they sent
home in 2005 represents more than 10 percent of world remittance
transfers. As these measures underscore, the Mexico–United States migration pattern is surely the largest unilateral flow of people (in one
direction) and resources (in the other) in the world.2 For Mexico, migration to the United States is a significant economic and demographic
phenomenon. Around 10 percent of individuals born in Mexico currently reside in the United States. The remittances these migrants send
back to Mexico represent only about 2.5 percent of Mexico’s national
income. However, Mexican migration is geographically concentrated.
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In some states, remittances represent more than 10 percent of income,
and in some regions within states, a much higher percentage.
Both migration flows from Mexico and remittance flows to Mexico
have grown rapidly in the past decade, mirroring international trends.
The U.S. Census Bureau (2003) estimates that the Mexican-born population of the United States increased by 4.8 million during the 1990s
and has continued to increase by 400,000 to 500,000 annually since.
The Bank of Mexico (Banco de México 2007) estimates that remittances totaled $2.5 billion in 1990, $5.6 billion in 1998, and $20 billion
in 2005, a 1990–2005 annual growth rate of 15 percent.
In what ways might these growing remittances affect the circumstances of households in sending countries (that is, countries that send
migrants abroad)? Given the large sums flowing as remittances, it is
easy to forget that remittances are actually large numbers of small flows:
a typical recipient household in Mexico receives a few hundred dollars
a month. This gives remittances a very different character from other
international flows, such as foreign direct investment or international
aid. Remittances flow to individuals, usually to those residing in households in the lower part of the income distribution. A growing number
of researchers are examining the impact of remittances on household
economic outcomes. I will summarize what we have learned from these
studies and will also highlight an issue that makes isolating the impact
of migration or remittances on the economies of sending countries very
difficult.

Measuring the impact of migration
How can we measure the impact of migration on economic outcomes in sending countries? The simplest way would be to compare
households with migrants and households without migrants. But in fact,
such a comparison might be very misleading, because of the nature of
migrants themselves. Migrants are not (or at least, are seldom) randomly selected from the population. For the most part, individuals, or individual households, choose to migrate, and others choose not to migrate,
for a wide variety of reasons. Some characteristics that affect the likelihood of migrating are easy to measure. For instance, the relative returns
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to university education in Mexico are greater than in the United States.
Thus, we might expect fewer individuals with a university education
to migrate. This we can easily measure. But international migration involves risk—the risk of not finding a job and the risk of traveling, primarily. So less risk-averse individuals or households may also be more
likely to migrate. However, risk aversion is difficult to measure, and it
may affect a variety of other economic decisions and outcomes.
The connection between migrant households and the formation of
microenterprises, an important element in the economies of sending
nations, suggests the complex interplay of forces to be considered in
analyzing the causes and effects of migration. If starting a household
business requires capital, and if capital markets function poorly, then
money earned abroad might be an important source of capital to start a
business. In fact, data from the 2000 Mexican population census indicate that there is a strong connection between migration and the formation of microenterprises. Table 4.1 shows self-employment rates among
household heads, both in households with and in households without
migrants, as measured by the census.3 In both urban and rural areas, and
for both males and females, household heads are more likely to be selfemployed in households with migrants.
Might this difference be caused by migration? Is it the result of remittance flows from migrants? Perhaps. But it also is possible that both
migration and self-employment are caused by some third factor that is
difficult to control for in making the comparison. Those who choose to
migrate may have more energy and be more entrepreneurial than those
who choose not to migrate. Those people who tend to be more entreTable 4.1 Self-Employment Rates in Mexico (%)
Urban males
Rural males
Urban females
Rural females

With migrant in family
36.8
44.9
38.0
44.0

Without migrant in family
27.4
36.6
26.8
37.0

NOTE: Data are for adults aged 18–65. Sampling weights are used so that the sample
represents all urban (population more than 100,000) and all rural (population less than
15,000) areas.
SOURCE: Mexican 2000 census population data.
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preneurial may be both more likely to migrate and more likely to enter
self-employment.
Untangling cause and effect is the challenge. Ideally, we would observe a group of identical individuals, some of whom migrate and some
of whom do not. Differences between the groups would then be attributable to migration. However, except in a few cases where migrants in
formal programs are chosen by lottery, this is not likely to be possible.
So we have to look for alternative ways of finding appropriate subsets of
the population to compare with migrants. In Mexico, I would argue, we
can make use of the fact that migrants historically have come disproportionately from a certain region of the country. A key to identifying the
impacts of migration on households in Mexico is that, at least historically, a handful of states in central-western Mexico have provided more
than half of the migrants to the United States. I will refer to this region
as the high-migration region. With some additional assumptions, we
can compare outcomes of households in the high-migration region with
outcomes of households in other, low-migration regions of Mexico.
Why do we need additional assumptions? Well, migration to another country requires some entrepreneurial initiative and a lot of energy.
Sometimes people of a given region have a reputation for being particularly entrepreneurial. Before we compare households in the high-migration region with those in low-migration regions, we need to rule out the
possibility that those in the high-migration region are not, collectively,
more entrepreneurial or energetic.
There are two steps to eliminating this possibility. First, we need
to ascertain that the differences in migration rates across regions are
caused by factors other than differences in individual initiative. Here,
understanding the origins of migration patterns is critical. Because
early migration patterns are interesting and, it turns out, important to
identifying the impacts of migration in Mexico, I will discuss them in
some detail.
Second, even if differences in migration were caused by factors
other than the characteristics of the people in the regions, we need to be
sure that migration rates are not correlated by happenstance with characteristics that might lead to favorable economic outcomes.
In the 1990s, fully a third of the migrants to the United States came
from one of three states in central-western Mexico: Jalisco, Michoacán,
and Guanajuato (Rodríguez Ramírez 2003). Residents of these states
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were roughly twice as likely to migrate as the average Mexican. Just 1.5
percent of migrants came from the four states east of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec—Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo—which
are home to 7 percent of the population.
Why did the central-western region of Mexico become such an
important source of migrants? The answer turns out to be railroads.
The first wave of migration from Mexico to the United States occurred
early in the twentieth century. Demand for labor in the United States
increased when migration from Europe slowed with the start of World
War I. Many Mexican workers were recruited to help build rail lines
in the southwestern United States. At the time, northern Mexico was
scarcely populated. Thus, labor recruiters from the United States looked
to the interior of Mexico. Recruiters chose as their destinations the interior states they could reach most quickly and at the lowest cost. These
were the states accessible by rail.4
Figure 4.1 shows a map of Mexico with the major north-south rail
lines as they existed around 1900. There were three major north-south
rail lines in Mexico at that time, each built between 1884 and 1900.
The first, the Central Mexican Railroad, went south from what is now
Ciudad Juarez to Irapuato in the state of Guanajuato, where it branched
east to Mexico City and west through Guadalajara to Colima near the
Pacific Coast. In the north, the Central Mexican Railroad connected
to the Southern Pacific and Texas Pacific railroads in Texas. A second
line, the Mexican International Railroad, ran a shorter distance, from
Durango through Chihuahua to Piedras Negras, then connected with
the Southern Pacific in Eagle Pass, Texas. A third, the Mexican National
Railroad, traveled north from Mexico City through San Luis Potosí and
Monterrey, reaching the border at Nuevo Laredo, just across the Rio
Grande from the southeastern Texas town of Laredo. This third line was
less well connected to rail lines in the United States.
The state of Jalisco and its capital, Guadalajara, represented the
closest area with a large population that was directly linked by rail. As
a result, Guadalajara became the center of the high-migration region.
By one estimate (Foerster 1925), 44 percent of migrants registering
in Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California came from just three
states in Mexico: Jalisco (20 percent), Michoacán (14 percent), and
Guanajuato (10 percent). (In 1920, these four U.S. states were home
to more than 90 percent of the Mexican-born population in the United
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Figure 4.1 Major North-South Rail Lines in Mexico, circa 1900
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SOURCE: Author’s rendition.

States [Borjas and Katz 2005].) Another source puts the share of migrants to the United States coming from these three Mexican states at
33 percent over the 1926–1932 period (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno
2001). Foerster’s 1924 data suggest that almost no migrants came from
the states east of the isthmus of Tehuantepec; the present-day states of
Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo were not connected
by rail to the rest of Mexico and collectively accounted for less than 1
percent of the migrants in 1924.
Early migration was very highly correlated with distance to the railroad. The state-level correlation between distance to the rail lines and
migration rates in the 1920s is 0.78. Of course, now few migrants travel
to the United States by rail. Do the early rail lines remain an important factor in explaining the states of origin of migrants? The answer is
yes. Early migrants provided information to others in their communities
about opportunities for work in the United States. During the 1990s—
long after railroads stopped being the main means of transportation
north—the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guanajuato remained the
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three states with the largest number of migrants going to the United
States. Each accounted for about 11 percent of the national total, and
collectively they accounted for 33.3 percent—almost exactly the same
as the 33 percent share that Durand, Massey and Zenteno (2001) cite
for the 1926–1932 period.5 Overall, the state-level correlation between
migration in the 1920s and migration in the second half of the 1990s
is 0.43; the correlation between migration during the second half of
the 1950s and the second half of the 1990s is 0.71. The early migrants
established networks, which reproduced themselves.
Both the data and the historical accounts suggest that the early rail
lines caused the central-western states in Mexico to become the most
important source of migrants. This resulting pattern, consistent over decades, opens the possibility that comparing outcomes in high- and lowmigration states might provide insights into the impact of migration on
local development. But we don’t quite yet have a convincing story. We
must first address concerns that present-day differences between people
in high- and low-migration regions may stem from factors other than
migration. Perhaps people from the high-migration region are different merely by chance, and the differences themselves did not cause the
migration. Or perhaps the rail lines caused differences in outcomes, not
just in the migration that they facilitated. Researchers who have relied
on differences in historical migration rates to identify the impacts of
migration in Mexico have concluded that neither of these is the case. I
leave the details of their evidence to later in the chapter, where I discuss
their results. For now, I will say only that the data indicate that the highmigration states were, on average, poorer than low-migration states
during the first half of the twentieth century. Hence, premigration measures of health, education, and income are lower in the high-migration
regions. A finding that households in high-migration regions now have
better outcomes implies that they have overcome this initial disadvantage. If anything, it appears that using historical migration regions as a
laboratory to observe migration’s economic effects is likely to provide
a conservative estimate of the impacts of migration.
Remittances and Migration
The 2000 Mexico population census asks whether any member
of the household has migrated outside of Mexico during the past five
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Figure 2: Migration rates by state, 1995-2000
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Migration Rate by State

Figure 4.2 Mexican Migration Rates by State, 1995–2000
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years. Slightly less than 5 percent of households report having at least
one migrant to the United States. Figure 4.2 shows a map of Mexico’s
32 states, labeled with the percentage of households in the state that had
migrants during the years between 1995 and 2000. The first column
of Table 4.2 shows the same data. As noted above, there is significant
variation in migration rates across states. Most of the high-migration
states are located in central-western Mexico, with the highest rates being found in the states of Zacatecas (which has migration from 15.1
percent of households), Michoacán (13.0 percent), and Guanajuato
(11.4 percent). States in southeastern Mexico have the lowest rates:
Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo all have rates below
1.3 percent.
The census survey also asks whether members of the household
have received money from family members living in another country.
Just over 3 percent of households report that one or more members receive remittances. The percentage of individuals in each state receiving
remittances is shown in column 2 of Table 4.2. At the state level, the
correlation between migration and remittance rates in the 2000 census
(columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.2) is 0.95.
What are the characteristics of households receiving remittances?
Several patterns are apparent in the data. First, rural households are
much more likely to receive remittances than urban households. Just
under 5 percent of households in localities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants report that they receive remittances, compared to just under 2 percent of households in urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
By education level, the general pattern is that the lower the education
level of the household head, the more likely the household is to receive
remittances. Among households whose heads have five or fewer years
of schooling, 5.3 percent report receiving remittances. Among those
with six years of schooling, 3.1 percent say they receive remittances,
and among those with 12 or more years of schooling, 1.2 percent report
receiving remittances. The pattern in education is consistent with the
fact that schooling attainment is lower in rural areas. At each schooling
level, rural households are about twice as likely to receive remittances
as are urban households.
Since there is a strong correlation between the schooling level of
the household head and household income, we can say in sum that rural
and lower-income households are more likely to receive remittances
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Table 4.2 State-Level Data on Households with Migrants and on
Households Receiving Remittances (%)
Households w/ international
migrants, 1995–2000
Aguascalientes
Baja California
Baja California Sur
Campeche
Chiapas
Chihuahua
Coahuila
Colima
Distrito Federal
Durango
Guanajuato
Guerrero
Hidalgo
Jalisco
Mexico State
Michoacán
Morelos
Nayarit
Nuevo León
Oaxaca
Puebla
Querétaro
Quintana Roo
San Luis Potosí
Sinaloa
Sonora
Tabasco
Tamaulipas
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
Yucatán
Zacatecas

9.01
2.65
1.56
1.05
0.94
4.80
3.08
6.82
2.05
9.28
11.40
7.56
8.62
8.16
3.24
13.02
8.74
8.39
2.65
5.47
4.55
6.18
0.90
8.67
4.09
1.89
0.71
3.62
3.20
3.66
1.26
15.12

Households receiving
remittances in 2000
4.90
3.00
0.70
0.70
0.50
3.40
2.50
5.10
1.10
7.80
6.90
5.80
3.80
5.70
1.40
8.50
4.60
6.80
1.70
3.00
2.50
2.70
0.60
6.30
3.30
2.20
0.40
2.70
1.60
2.00
1.00
10.40

NOTE: Correlation of the percentage of households with migrants and the percentage
of households with remittances is 0.953. All averages are calculated using the factor
weights provided in the census to reproduce the population of each state.
SOURCE: Mexican 2000 census population data.
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than are urban and higher-income households. Because rural and lower-income households are those most affected by infant mortality and
early dropout rates, we might expect remittances to have an effect on
these outcomes. And because self-employment in Mexico is strongly
negatively correlated with schooling attainment, we might also expect
remittances to affect the rate of self-employment. And, finally, if remittances raise household income, then the direct effect of remittances
should tend to reduce income inequality.
Remittances or Migration?
Using the historical migration networks to identify an appropriate
group of households to compare with migrant households helps to resolve the problem of endogeneity arising from missing information. But
we should be careful about which effects we seek to identify through
the historical migration networks. Briefly put, the historical networks
allow us to identify the long-run impacts of migration on local development. By themselves, the historical migration networks don’t allow
us to separate the impact of remittances from other impacts related to
migration. For example, migrants living abroad may gain knowledge
or formal education that will affect their behavior when they return to
their home country. This appears to be a part of the story where health
outcomes are concerned.
Of course, remittances are likely to be the most important channel
through which migration affects development. But they may not be the
only channel. Even though the historical migration patterns are highly
correlated with current remittance flows, when we use the historical
migration in a two-stage least squares setup, we will identify only this
long-run historical component. Identifying the impact of remittances
per se will require a different instrument. For instance, short-run rainfall
shocks might be expected to correlate with remittance flows; however,
the rainfall shocks are likely to affect most of the other outcomes we are
interested in measuring.
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Using historical migration networks to
identify the impacts of migration
Several researchers have used Mexico’s historical migration networks to identify the impacts of migration on many different outcomes.
I will focus the discussion here on three outcomes: capital for microenterprises, health, and education. With one exception, the authors I refer
to claim to be identifying the impact of migration over the long term
rather than the short term.
As the data in Table 4.1 indicate, self-employment is very common
in Mexico. In urban areas, close to a quarter of the labor force is selfemployed. The majority (about 60 percent) of these workers have no
employees. The remaining 40 percent are split almost equally between
those who “hire” only unpaid family workers and those who hire at
least one paid-wage worker. The raw data in Table 4.1 appear to suggest that migration is associated with entry into self-employment, since
percentages of those who are self-employed range from 7 to 11 percent
higher in the four demographic categories if they have a migrant in the
family.
Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) examine the impact of migration
on microenterprises. Migration may affect either the supply of capital available to invest in microenterprises or the demand for products
produced by microenterprises. (Massey and Parrado [1994] coined the
term “migradollars” to describe the latter phenomenon.) Remittances
flowing into a community increase the spending power of its residents.
When asked how they spend remittances, respondents of most surveys indicate that 90 percent or more of the money is spent on current
consumption (immediate needs). This spending increases demand for
goods sold by local stores. Since about a third of microenterprises are
involved in retail trade, migradollars may have a significant impact on
the sales—and hence on the capital investments—of microenterprises.
In order to separate the demand-side and supply-side impacts of
remittances on microenterprise investments, Woodruff and Zenteno
(2007) focus on a group they refer to as internal migrants—the subset of
individuals who reside in a Mexican state other than their state of birth.
They argue that migration networks survive not only across time but
across space as well. Using 2000 population census data, they show that
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people living in the same state are more likely to receive remittances
if they were born in high-migration states rather than in low-migration
states.
In other words, consider two households living in Mexico City, one
whose head was born in Michoacán (high migration) and one whose
head was born in Yucatán (low migration). The former is significantly
more likely to receive remittances. Since these two individuals live in
the same city, they face similar demand-side impacts from migradollars flowing into that city. But as the result of migration networks, they
have different access to capital. Thus, by focusing on internal migrants,
Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) are able to isolate the impact of migration on the supply of capital to microenterprises.
Examining first the effect of migration on the decision to be selfemployed, Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) find no significant correlation
between migration and entry into self-employment, instrumenting for
migration with either the historical migration rates or with the distance
of the state to the railroad network circa 1910. This suggests that the correlation found in Table 4.1 more likely reflects the fact that households
that are more entrepreneurial are both more likely to have migrants and
more likely to start an enterprise, and that migration has no causal effect
on the formation of microenterprises in urban areas in Mexico.
However, Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) do find a clear and robust
association between migration and the amount of capital invested in
household enterprises. By their estimate, migration is causally associated with about one-quarter of all capital invested in microenterprises
located in urban areas in Mexico. Table 4.3 shows the results they report
on the impact of migration on investment in each of five investment
categories. The largest effect is on vehicles. Since the authors are unable to separate returned migrants from those investing remittances sent
by others, it is likely that part of this effect reflects the frequency with
which migrants return to Mexico with a vehicle purchased in the United
States. But investments in inventories and (more marginally) in tools
and equipment are also significantly associated with migration.
The basic results provide support for the importance of remittances
as a source of capital in microenterprises. But what effect does that
capital have on the sales and earnings of the enterprises? Here the answer appears to differ according to the capital intensity of the sector.
In high-capital sectors, migration is associated with higher investment,
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Table 4.3 Log of Replacement Cost of Invested Capital by Type
of Investment

Migration rate,
state of birth
State fixed effects
Industry controls
Number of
observations
R-squared

Real estate
3.04
(0.85)
Yes
Yes
1,675

Tools and
equipment
4.70
(1.69)
Yes
Yes
1,675

Vehicles
9.35
(2.38)
Yes
Yes
1,675

0.13

0.42

0.34

Other
Inventories investments
6.38
3.44
(2.00)
(1.01)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,675
1,675
0.41

0.34

Note: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state
level for the state of birth. Sample limited to owners 18–65 years of age working at
least 35 hours per week. The migration rate is instrumented with the distance from
the north-south railway lines, as described in the text. In addition to the variables
shown, all regressions include seven variables indicating the sector of activity. Other
controls included in the regression are years of schooling of the owner, the estimated
labor market experience (age minus years of schooling minus 6), the age of the firm in
years, the square of each of these variables, a dummy indicating that the owner reports
data for two enterprises, and the income per capita in the owner’s state of birth.
SOURCE: Woodruff and Zenteno (2007).

higher sales, and higher profits. In low-capital sectors, there is a much
smaller positive impact on investment and profits, and no impact on
sales. These results suggest that remittances from migration relieve
capital constraints where they are more likely to bind—in high-capital sectors. But enterprises in low-capital sectors might be viewed as a
place to stash the liquidity coming from migration, without generating
such dramatic effects on the operation of the enterprise.
Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) are interested in the impact of
migration on child health outcomes in Mexico. Here, the methodological problem they encounter is that healthier families may be more likely
to migrate, hence a positive correlation between healthy children and
migration may be the result of causation in either direction. To avoid
this problem, the authors use state-level historical migration data as an
instrument for current migration. Yet they still must address the concern that historical migration is associated either positively or negatively with contemporaneous health conditions. However, they find that
migration rates in 1924 are not significantly correlated with child mortality rates in 1930, the earliest date for which such data are available.
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They also find that historical migration rates are largely uncorrelated
with measures of health services in 1996.
Hildebrandt and McKenzie find that migration has a large and significant impact on the well-being of children in Mexico. They use data
from the 1997 Mexican demographic survey of households known as
ENADID, which includes information on whether anyone from the
household has ever migrated.6 Because they are interested in the impact
of migration on children after the act of migration, they define migrant
households as those households with at least one migrant going to the
United States before the beginning of 1994, and nonmigrant households
as those with no migrants or later migrants. Hildebrandt and McKenzie
report positive effects of migration on the health of children in Mexico
once the endogeneity of migration is taken into account. The effects are
large. Migration is associated with about a 3.0-percentage-point reduction in the probability of a baby dying in the first year of life, and an increase in birth weight of 350 grams, or around 0.8 pounds. The authors’
OLS results suggest no significant correlation between migration and
health. The lack of significance in the OLS regressions combined with
the significant positive outcomes found in the instrumental variable
regressions together suggest that the positive health outcomes themselves make migration less likely. Not all of the impacts of migration on
children’s health are positive, however. Children born in migrant households are less likely to be vaccinated or to see doctors during the first
year of their lives. Hildebrandt and McKenzie attribute this to greater
time demands on the parent because of migration from the household.
The findings of Hildebrandt and McKenzie are corroborated by
López Córdoba (2005), who uses municipio (county) level data from
the 2000 Mexican population census to examine the impact of migration and remittances on health and education. López Córdoba attempts
to separate the impact of migration from the impact of remittances by
using historical migration to control for migration and by using current
remittance flows to measure remittances.7 Because historical migration
rates are available only at the state level, López Córdoba proxies for
historical migration by measuring the distance from each municipio to
the nearest rail line existing in the 1920s, plus the distance from that
point to the border. Since most migrants—and labor recruiters—traveled by rail at that time, the distance proxies for the cost of migration.
López Córdoba also includes a measure of the percentage of house-
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holds in each municipio that reported receiving remittances in 2000.
His claim is, then, that the distance variable accounts for long-run impacts of migration and allows for the isolation of the impact of current
remittance flows, through the remittance variable. López Córdoba finds
that infant mortality is decreasing in the share of households receiving
remittances and increasing in the historical cost of migration. The latter
implies again that migration is negatively associated with infant mortality rates, since migration itself falls as migration costs rise. López
Córdoba focuses his discussion on the magnitude of the effect of remittances, which appears to be about a third of the magnitude of the effect
reported by Hildebrandt and McKenzie.
There is slightly more disagreement with respect to migration’s
effect on educational attainment, but a general picture emerges from
several studies addressing this issue. Several issues make understanding the impact of migration on education particularly difficult. For one
thing, most databases organize individuals by households. As early as
age 16, children begin to split off to form their own households, or,
more frequently, join the household of a relative in another city. Tracking the individual to the remittance behavior of the household then becomes impossible. Also, in urban areas, at earlier ages the children’s
schooling attainment and attendance do not vary much, because primary schooling is universal in urban Mexico and lower secondary schooling is nearly so.
With this in mind, Hanson and Woodruff (2003) study educational
attainment in rural areas in Mexico among children 10–14 years of age.
An issue for the analysis of dynamics in rural regions is that households
seldom move from rural areas in one state to rural areas in another state.
Thus, the strategy Woodruff and Zenteno (forthcoming) use to separate
high-migration households and high-migration states is not available
to Hanson and Woodruff. Instead, Hanson and Woodruff juxtapose the
historical migration rates with household characteristics that are associated with migration, such as age and education of the mother. They find
that migration has a positive effect on schooling in households in which
the female head has two or fewer years of schooling. About a third of
households in rural areas have female heads with two or fewer years of
schooling. Among the two-thirds of the rural households in which the
female head has higher levels of schooling, Hanson and Woodruff find
a significant effect only among 10- to 12-year-old boys.
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McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) use the ENADID 1997 survey in
Mexico to examine the impact of migration on schooling outcomes
among 12- to 18-year-olds in localities with populations below 50,000.
They find that migration has a negative effect on schooling for both
boys and girls 16–18 years of age, and a negative effect among boys
aged 12–15. Hanson and Woodruff also find a negative effect among
boys aged 13–15 whose mothers have three or more years of schooling.
Among girls of the same age, Hanson and Woodruff find a positive,
significant effect where mothers have low schooling and a negative,
insignificant effect where mothers have three or more years of schooling. McKenzie and Rapoport attribute the negative effects of migration
on schooling among 16- to 18-year-olds to a low return on education
(since education obtained in Mexico has a low value in labor markets
in the United States) and to higher opportunity costs caused by missing
household members. However, it may also be the case that continuing
on to high school requires moving out of the household to a city, since
high schools are not common in rural areas. The question then is whether those who have stayed in school and left the household are reported
as regular members of the household. If they are, then the results suggest a strong negative impact of migration on educational attainment at
higher levels.
Finally, McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) examine the broader impacts of migration on income inequality in Mexico, again using historical migration as a means of identifying the impacts. They reach the
interesting conclusion that migration initially increases inequality, because the cost of migration means that the poorest households do not
migrate. However, once migration networks are established in a community, the costs of migrating fall. Members of poorer households then
migrate with more frequency, and inequality is reduced.
Most of the issues addressed in the research on impacts of migration—health, education, and capital for household enterprises—are
particularly acute problems among the lower-income households in
Mexico. With the exception of the suggestion that migration may have
a negative impact on high school education, the research indicates that
migration has a positive impact on economic outcomes in each of these
areas. Since, as was noted earlier, remittances flow to lower-income
(as measured by the schooling attainment of the head) and rural house-
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holds, this suggests that over the longer term, we should expect remittances to reduce income inequality in Mexico.

Conclusion
I have focused on the impacts of migration from a single country,
Mexico. Households with members who migrate abroad are likely to
differ in systematic ways from households without migrants. The difficulty in measuring all of the ways in which these two groups of households differ presents a challenge for those attempting to identify the impacts of migration on sending countries. Is an observed difference the
result of migration, or is it the cause of migration? Absent a strategy for
identifying an appropriate comparison group, this is a difficult question
to answer. For much of the past half-century, development economists
have been primarily concerned with the negative impacts of migration
on sending countries, such as brain drain. But an increasing number of
studies examining diverse outcomes in Mexico are showing that migration has positive impacts there. Taken together, the studies also suggest
that migration’s effects are complex. In Mexico, it appears that educational attainment increases for younger children but decreases for older
children. Child mortality appears to decrease with migration, but so do
visits to doctors and vaccinations. Self-employment rates in urban areas
remain unchanged, but the level of capital investment in enterprises and
the earnings derived from those enterprises increase.
Whether migration has similar effects in other sending countries
is unclear. What is clear is that the best strategies for untangling these
effects will vary from country to country and will take advantage of circumstances that allow for new insights into the phenomenon of remittances. The key is not the specific instrument used to separate cause and
effect, but the identification of an appropriate instrument for a given
region or country. In Mexico, historical migration patterns are useful
vehicles for comparison. In other countries, researchers have devised
other novel strategies. One example of this is provided by Yang’s (2004)
work measuring the impact of remittances in the Philippines. Yang uses
the devaluation of Asian currencies in 1997–1998 to identify the impacts of remittances on economic outcomes. This strategy is specific
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to the Philippines, whose migrants are dispersed around the globe. The
devaluation of many Asian currencies in the 1997–1998 period provided a nice natural shock to remittance flows into the Philippines: the
Philippine peso value of remittances from migrants to the United States,
or to Middle Eastern countries paying wages in dollars, increased when
the Philippine currency was devalued. But since the Korean, Thai, and
other Asian currencies were devalued at the same time, the remittances
of workers in those countries did not similarly increase.
It is not possible to exploit this kind of variation in Mexico or Central America, where the vast majority of migrants go to a single country, the United States. However, isolation of the impacts of migration
in Mexico, an important sending country, is possible because patterns
of historical migration allow us to identify an appropriate comparison
group against which to measure the progress of migrant households.
Most of the issues addressed in the research on impacts of migration—health, education, and capital for household enterprises—are
particularly acute problems among the lower-income households in
Mexico. With the exception of the suggestion that migration may have
a negative impact on high school education, the research indicates that
migration has a positive impact on economic outcomes. Since remittances flow to lower-income (as measured by the schooling attainment
of the head) and rural households, this suggests that over the long term
we should expect remittances to contribute to a reduction of income
inequality in Mexico.

Notes
1. Remittance flows are sometimes divided into three categories: compensation for
workers, remittances, and migrant transfers. The first two are differentiated by
the length of time the worker is resident in the destination country and whether
he or she is considered a resident there. Both of these are captured as current
flows in the balance of payments. The third category is captured on the capital
account side of balance of payments. Since governments often have a difficult
time identifying current flows with precision, the sum of the three categories is
likely to be more accurate than the individual categories. Even so, we should
recognize that remittance flows are difficult to track and that the data provided
are only estimates.
2. As of 2000, only Russia (12.2 million) had more emigrants than Mexico (10.1
million), according to estimates (Parsons et al. 2005). About 95 percent of mi-
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3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

grants from Mexico live in the United States, while the Russian diaspora is more
dispersed geographically.
The census distinguishes between households with and households without migrants by asking whether anyone in the household has migrated during the past
five years—that is, between 1995 and 2000.
Railroads were the only practical means for traveling long distances over land in
Mexico in the early 1900s. According to Coatsworth (1972, pp. 86–93), stagecoach travel in 1910 was three times as costly and was only one-fifth as fast.
Estimates by state vary slightly, but one reasonable estimate based on Mexican
census data suggests that during the 1990s 11.1 percent came from Guanajuato,
11.2 percent from Jalisco, and 11.0 percent from Michoacán (Rodríguez Ramírez
2003).
The survey is conducted at five-year intervals. ENADID stands for Encuesta
Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica, or National Survey on Demographic
Dynamics.
López Córdoba uses the coefficient of variation in historical monthly rainfall as
an instrument for current remittance receipts. He argues that higher variation in
rainfall within the year gives rise to a greater need for consumption-smoothing
strategies, including remittances.
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5
Remittance Patterns of
Latin American Immigrants
in the United States
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes
San Diego State University

Migrant remittances, defined as transfers of funds from migrants
in the United States to relatives or friends in their country of origin,
have increasingly attracted the attention of policymakers as the large
amounts of money involved and the role of remittances in economic
development have become more evident. Indeed, at a macroeconomic
level, remittances constitute one of the largest and least volatile sources
of foreign exchange in many developing economies. The magnitude
of these remittance flows is only expected to rise, given the increasing out-migration experienced by many of these regions. As noted by
de Vasconcelos (2005) of the Inter-American Development Bank, nowhere is this movement of workers and funds more important than in
Latin America and the Caribbean, where domestic incomes and capital
flows have been drying up following periods of economic crisis. Remittances from the United States to Latin American and Caribbean nations totaled more than $40 billion in 2004. This amount exceeded the
combined flows of all foreign direct investment (FDI) and net official
development assistance (ODA) to the region. De Vasconcelos goes on
to note that the volume of remittances received by the Latin American
and Caribbean countries is now the highest and fastest growing of any
region in the world. Remittances surpass tourism income in each country of that region, account for at least 10 percent of the gross domestic
product (GDP) in six countries, and almost always exceed a country’s
largest export.
Perhaps the most popular task of economists studying the remittance market in recent years has been the measurement of these flows.
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In addition, the literature has tried to gain a better understanding of
migrants’ remitting patterns and the microeconomic impacts of these
patterns by examining who is likely to remit, for what purposes, and
how remittances are ultimately used by the receiving families. Yet the
lack of comparable survey instruments has impeded the completion of
interesting cross-country comparisons that would shed some light on
the role of socioeconomic, political, and cultural differences in explaining migrants’ remittance patterns and how their families and friends
ultimately use the funds they send back home.
In this chapter, I use two surveys—the Mexican Migration Project
and the Latin American Migration Project—designed to measure migration and migrants’ remitting patterns across several countries. The
similitude of these two survey instruments allows for a comparative
analysis. In particular, it permits us to uncover country-level similarities and differences that are key in devising policies to facilitate these
money flows and maximize their potential for improving the livelihood
of migrants’ families back home.

Data
The Mexican Migration Project (MMP93) reports only on Mexico, whereas the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) reports on
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Peru.1 The
LAMP is a companion project to the MMP93, which was begun in 1982
to study the migration patterns of Mexicans within Mexico as well as
Mexicans who have come to the United States. The MMP93 database
includes detailed social, demographic, and economic information from
approximately 16,000 households in 93 representative communities in
17 of Mexico’s 31 states.2 The MMP93 survey was carried out annually
in the winter months of 1982–1983 and 1987–2002.3 For each household, a complete life history is gathered on the household head, including detailed information on past migration experiences in the United
States (number and duration of trips, documentation used, etc.). After
gathering information on these households, interviewers travel to the
destination areas in the United States to administer identical questionnaires to households from the same communities in Mexico; these im-
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migrants have settled in the United States and no longer return home.
Altogether, the 5,837 immigrants surveyed in the MMP93 constitute
a reasonably representative data set on authorized and unauthorized
Mexican immigrants in the United States (Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak,
and Pozo 2005; Massey and Zenteno 2000; Munshi 2003).
The LAMP uses the same methodology as the MMP93 to expand
our knowledge of migration in a variety of countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean. So far, only one wave of data is available—that
wave having been collected between 1999 and 2003, depending on the
country under consideration. Because of this, when I explore household remittance-receiving patterns, I work with data from approximately 1,400 households from Costa Rica, a little under 1,000 households
from the Dominican Republic, about 300 households from Haiti, almost
1,800 households in Nicaragua, and close to 700 households from Peru.
When investigating immigrants’ remitting patterns, I rely on data from
approximately 192 immigrants from Costa Rica, 166 immigrants from
the Dominican Republic, 36 immigrants from Haiti, 161 immigrants
from Nicaragua, and 61 immigrants from Peru.

Migration as the Precondition to Remittances
To the extent that remittances are money transfers from emigrants
of a country to friends and relatives back in their countries of origin,
these flows are conditional on the out-migration patterns of the receiving economies. As such, it is illuminating to ask the following questions about emigrants from each of these countries: What percentage of
emigrants from these economies enter illegally into the United States?
What percentage rely on smugglers to help them cross the border? How
much do migrants pay, on average, for the smugglers’ services? Has
the cost significantly increased during the past decade? Finally, how
many trips do legal and unauthorized migrants in each of these countries make to the United States, on average?
These questions all provide us with valuable information likely to
influence remittance payments. For instance, countries with a higher
proportion of unauthorized immigrants in the United States may be
more likely to receive larger remittance flows. After all, unauthor-
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ized immigrants are exposed to higher income risks and, as such,
may be more likely to remit money back home as an insurance mechanism in case the migration experience turns out to be unsuccessful
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006). Likewise, the broad use of smuggling services is likely to make the migratory experience more expensive. The debt incurred often means that migrants must pay back immediate family and relatives for funding their trip. Alternatively, migrants
may have to foot the expenses for additional family members to come
(Ilahi and Jafarey 1999). Finally, frequent trips back home may also
influence how much money is remitted home on a periodic basis as
opposed to being brought back home at the end of the migration experience (Bauer and Sinning 2005).
Figures 5.1–5.3 and Tables 5.1A and 5.1B provide some combined
migration statistics for all the countries included in this study as well
as separate statistics for each country. Approximately 68 percent of the
6,392 Latin American immigrants in the study, or about 4,350, are unauthorized.4 Additionally, about 75 percent of illegal border crossers
use smuggling services. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show these same categories
broken down by immigrants’ country of origin. Mexico is the country
Figure 5.1 Percentage of Unauthorized Immigrants, by Country
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SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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Figure 5.2 Percentage of Unauthorized Immigrants Using Smugglers,
by Country
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SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.

we are most familiar with in this respect, given the predominance of
Mexicans among all other immigrant groups in the United States. The
percentage of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico is more than twice
as high as the percentage from Nicaragua, the country with the next
highest percentage of illegals. This may possibly be explained by the
greater distance to be traveled in the case of Costa Rica and Nicaragua,
and the hazards of sea travel in the case of Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. Additionally, an even higher percentage of unauthorized immigrants rely on the services provided by smugglers in Costa Rica (91
percent) and Nicaragua (81 percent) than do so in Mexico (74 percent).
As such, the possibility exists that Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans remit
substantial sums of money back home, either to pay back their own
travel loans or to finance the comparatively more expensive trips of
relatives. The lowest usage of smuggling is found among immigrants
from the Dominican Republic. Because only a small number of observations are available for this country, it is difficult to ascertain why such
low rates occur here. However, the lower use of smuggling services
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Figure 5.3 Average Number of Border Crossings per Migrant, by
Documentation Status and Use of Smuggling Services
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by Dominicans could be, in part, related to the lower realized success
rate of smuggler-aided crossings among Dominicans in the survey compared to the rate for unauthorized Dominicans who choose not to rely
on these services.
We also have information on the average number of crossings for
legal versus unauthorized immigrants in each of the countries being
surveyed (Figure 5.3). As we would expect, legal immigrants make a
larger number of U.S. visits—three on average—than do unauthorized
immigrants, who average two to almost three.5 Therefore, we would
expect unauthorized immigrants to remit more money to their families than legal immigrants, who can more easily return home and bring
money back to their families in person.
Tables 5.1A and 5.1B give the cost in U.S. dollars to unauthorized
immigrants of using smuggling services. Unauthorized immigrants are
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a group that carries special interest given their potentially higher likelihood of remitting larger proportions of their earnings back home. Only
62 percent of illegal border crossers using smugglers report on the cost
incurred from using their services. On average, these unauthorized immigrants report paying $427 for each crossing. This cost was as low
as $303 during the 1990s and increased to an average of $633 from
2000 onwards. Table 5.1A also shows how immigrants’ use of smuggling services is inversely related to the cost of such services, thus suggesting the existence of a downward sloping demand for smuggling
services on the part of unauthorized immigrants. Table 5.1B reveals
large variation by country in smuggling costs. Mexican immigrants,
at an average cost per trip of about $370, pay the least for smuggling
services, which is to be expected because of the geographic proximity
of Mexico to the United States. In contrast, Costa Rica, the most distant country from the United States in the sample under consideration,
has the highest average amount paid by its emigrants for smuggling
services (about $2,100). The average price paid by Nicaraguans is approximately $1,700, whereas Dominicans pay about $1,000. Given the
limited number of observations available for some of these countries,
it is difficult to clearly identify trends. However, if we focus on those
countries for which there are a larger number of observations—Mexico,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica—it appears as if smuggling costs have been
Table 5.1A Average Cost of Smuggling Services and Its Relationship to
Successful Crossings, All Countries ($)
N
Mean
Std. dev.
Average cost
2,034
426.74
584.62
Average cost by decade
of last U.S. visit
During 1990s
1,273
303.25
408.88
2000 and later
761
633.33
752.45
Average cost by number
of successful crossings
None
11
815.23
1,417.40
One
1,050
462.53
662.59
Two
498
393.57
489.86
Three
266
362.03
423.58
Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Mean
Std. dev. N
Mean Std. dev.
Variable
N
Average cost
32 2,101.56 1,223.72 13 1,035.58 977.21
Average cost by decade of last U.S. visit
During 1990s 11 1,022.73
611.30 7 1,090.29 1,322.55
2000 and later 21 2,666.67 1,076.49 6
971.75 527.80
Average cost of smuggling services by number of successful crossings
None
0
—
—
1 1,130.00
—
One
24 1,981.25 1,172.22 11
962.05 1,065.57
Two
6 2,158.33 1,473.32 1 1,750.00
—
Three
1 3,000.00
—
—
—
—
NOTE: — = not available.
Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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Table 5.1B Average Cost of Smuggling Services and Its Relationship to Successful Crossings, by Immigrants’
Country of Origin ($)
N
2

Haiti
Mean
Std. dev. N
4,000.00 2,828.43 36

Nicaragua
Mean Std. dev.
N
1,670.60 1,298.21 1,961

Mexico
Mean Std. dev.
368.60
445.54

1
1

6,000.00
2,000.00

1,401.54
981.53 1,227
2,477.78 1,806.95 724

263.50
546.73

0
2
—
—

—
4,000.00
—
—

—
—
1,279.02 1,327.38
1,428.57 1,234.52
—
—

783.75 1,490.01
375.38
476.43
353.92
381.79
352.08
391.97

—
—

27
9

—
0
2,828.43 29
—
7
—
—

10
984
484
265

280.38
592.92
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on the rise since the 1990s. In the cases of Mexico and Costa Rica,
these costs have more than doubled. The increasing cost of smuggling
services may have heightened the need on the part of immigrants to remit money home, both to pay their debt and to finance the migration of
additional household members to the United States. It is interesting to
note how the downward-sloping demand for smuggling services on the
part of unauthorized immigrants suggested by Table 5.1A is supported
by the Mexican data in Table 5.1B. However, in the case of Costa Ricans or Nicaraguans, a larger number of successful illegal border crossings is directly linked to a higher cost for smuggling services. As such,
these migrants may be “getting what they paid for.”

Immigrants’ Remitting Patterns: How Much is
Sent? By Whom? For What Purposes?
How Much?
Perhaps the most basic yet difficult task of remittance researchers
has been to measure these money flows and the percentage of immigrants sending money back home. Table 5.2 provides a comparison
of such figures across the countries being examined. More than 5,700
immigrants, or about 89 percent of immigrants in the sample, provide
information regarding their remitting practices. Approximately 70 percent of those 5,703 immigrants report that they sent money back home
on a monthly basis during their last U.S. trip. This figure is in line with
the more than 60 percent of immigrants from Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Haiti that remit money home. In
contrast, only 46 percent of the 52 Peruvian immigrants in the sample
sent money home to their families on a monthly basis.
Table 5.2 also lists the average dollar amounts remitted home by
immigrants from these Latin American and Caribbean nations. These
average $300 a month, or 40 percent of immigrants’ income. Money
transfers are smallest among immigrants from the Dominican Republic
($179 a month) and largest among immigrants from Costa Rica ($493).
In line with this, Dominicans remit approximately 16 percent of their
monthly earnings, whereas Costa Ricans remit about 55 percent. How-
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Table 5.2 Remittance Patterns for Surveyed Latin American Countries
Share of migrants Average amount
remitting
remitted ($)
All countries
Mean
Std. dev.
N
Costa Rica
Mean
Std. dev.
N
Dominican Republic
Mean
Std. dev.
N
Haiti
Mean
Std. dev.
N
Nicaragua
Mean
Std. dev.
N
Peru
Mean
Std. dev.
N
Mexico
Mean
Std. dev.
N

As a share of
income

0.71
0.46
5,703

301.68
418.48
4,034

0.40
0.98
3,270

0.69
0.46
167

492.91
865.46
115

0.55
1.00
78

0.67
0.47
154

179.18
195.31
103

0.16
0.21
84

0.74
0.45
19

284.56
251.78
14

0.13
0.06
7

0.61
0.49
132

223.18
255.03
80

0.22
0.35
61

0.46
0.50
52

376.55
371.75
24

0.16
0.14
12

0.71
0.45
5,179

300.43
403.35
3,698

0.41
1.00
3,028

Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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ever, there is not always a direct relationship between the dollar amount
remitted and the percentage of monthly earnings remitted home. For instance, while the average dollar amount remitted by Peruvians is above
the mean for the group of countries being examined, the percentage of
income remitted by Peruvians is far below—they remit only 16 percent
of their monthly earnings, compared to 41 percent for the other nationalities in the sample.
By Whom?
In addition to measuring remittance transfers, the literature has long
examined immigrants’ remitting motives. Overall, a variety of reasons
for sending money back home has been identified, including altruism,
exchange, investment, and coinsurance. The altruism motive suggests
that remittance payments made by migrants to their families increase
with the needs of household members back home (Becker 1974). The
exchange motive, or at least the most predominant one, comes from
existing evidence of immigrants repaying family members and friends
back home for financing their trip (Cox 1987). Another motive, investment, occurs when immigrants remit money back home to purchase
assets with the intent of earning an economic return. And Lucas and
Stark (1985) call attention to yet another motive for sending money
back home—coinsurance, by which both immigrants and family members or friends provide monetary and in-kind transfers to insure each
other against economic shocks.
For What Purposes?
The MMP93 and LAMP ask remitters their purpose in sending money back home. Remitters are allowed to choose up to five motives for
transferring money home. For practical purposes, these motives can be
grouped into either “consumption” or “asset accumulation/investment,”
depending on whether remittances are sent by immigrants to cover the
consumption needs of family and friends back home or to be invested in
productive activities. Whether a particular expenditure category should
constitute consumption or asset accumulation is debatable, particularly
when it comes to assets such as housing. However, for the purposes of
this study, I group the following motives under the category of asset ac-
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cumulation: construction or repair of house, purchase of a house or lot,
purchase of tools, purchase of livestock, purchase of agricultural inputs,
start-up or expansion of a business, educational expenses, health expenses, and savings. In contrast, consumption comprises the following
expenditures: food and maintenance, purchase of a vehicle, purchase
of consumer goods, financing a special event, recreation/entertainment
expenses, and debt payments. Figure 5.4 addresses migrants’ remitting
motives. Because migrants can indicate up to five motives for remitting money back home, the percentages of migrants sending money for
consumption and asset accumulation purposes do not add up to 100.
According to Figure 5.4, consumption is the overwhelming purpose behind immigrants’ remitting practices, yet a nontrivial portion of remitters specify asset accumulation as a reason for sending money home.
Figure 5.4 Percentage of Immigrants That Remit for Consumption and
Asset Accumulation
140
Consumption

Asset accumulation
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Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because more than one purpose may be reported.
Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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Consumption appears to be a more pressing remittance motive for immigrants coming from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Peru, Nicaragua,
and Costa Rica than it does for those from Mexico: only a small fraction
of immigrants from those economies (never more than 18 percent of
remitters) indicate sending money back home for asset accumulation
purposes.
Several empirical studies have noted that remittances differ according to immigrants’ age, family responsibilities back home, earnings,
and whether they have temporary or permanent status (de la Garza and
Lowell 2002; Taylor 1999). In addition to these characteristics, Tables
5.3 through 5.6 examine the variability of immigrants’ remitting patterns and purposes according to whether or not the immigrants were
authorized upon entry, their educational attainment, decade of visit, and
area of residence while in the United States. Several findings are worth
discussing. The data in Table 5.3 confirm what was hypothesized earlier
in the chapter: that a higher percentage of unauthorized immigrants (75
percent) remit money back home than legal migrants do (64 percent).
Yet the data in Table 5.4 indicate that there is not much difference in
the percentage of earnings that these two groups of immigrants remit
home.
Likewise, less educated immigrants appear more likely to remit than
their more educated counterparts (59 percent compared to 50 percent
in Table 5.3). There are no statistically significant differences among
countries in how likely less educated immigrants are to remit relative to
more educated immigrants. Nor do less educated immigrants seem to
send a significantly higher proportion of their incomes home than more
educated immigrants (20 versus 17 percent, Table 5.4).
Other interesting results refer to remittance trends. According to the
data in Table 5.3, a higher percentage of Latin American immigrants
have transferred money to their families during the present decade than
in the 1990s. This is the case for Costa Ricans, Dominicans, Nicaraguans, Peruvians, and Mexicans; the exception is Haitians. However,
the limited number of observations for Haiti casts doubt on any conclusions. Furthermore, Table 5.4 indicates that, as a percentage of migrants’ monthly earnings, remittance transfers have also been on the
rise among Dominicans and Peruvians during the current decade.
A final aspect revealed by Tables 5.3 and 5.4 involves changes in
remitting patterns according to whether immigrants resided in a large
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All countries
%
t-stat.
Variable
By documentation status
Legal
0.64
—
Unauthorized
0.75 −8.36***
By educational attainment
Up to 15 years
0.59
—
16+ years
0.50
2.37**
By decade of visit
During 1990s
0.67
—
2000 and later
0.79 −9.79***
By area where they stayed in the U.S.
Not a large city
0.73
—
Large city
0.67
5.42***

Costa Rica
%
  t-stat.

Dominican
Republic
%
  t-stat.

Haiti
%
t-stat.

Nicaragua
%
t-stat.

Perua
%
  t-stat.

0.66
0.80

—
−1.76*

0.68
0.57

—
0.75

0.69
1.00

—
−2.61**

0.57
0.80

—
−2.22**

0.44
1.00

0.60
0.33

—
1.48

0.69
0.73

—
−0.35

0.75
0.50

—
0.48

0.56
0.53

—
0.29

0.56
0.37

—
2.63**

0.56
0.67

—
−1.28

0.22
0.64

0.56
0.73

—
−1.82*

—
—

0.45
0.81

—
−4.76***

0.58
0.83

—
−3.39***

0.92
0.33

0.68
0.78

—
−0.86

0.54
0.73

—
−2.28**

0.70
0.78

—
−0.37

—
−7.90***
—
1.29
—
−3.42***
—
—
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Table 5.3 Percentage of Migrants Remitting, by Documentation Status, Education, Decade, and City Dweller
Mexico
%
  t-stat.
0.66
0.75
0.58
0.50

—
−7.34***
—
1.44

0.68
0.79

—
−8.92***

0.75
0.66

—
6.56***

note: — = not available. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level
(two-tailed test). The hypothesis being tested is Ha: diff ≠ 0.
a
Information on migrant residency while in the United States is not available in the Peruvian survey.
Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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Table 5.4 Percentage of Income Remitted Home, by Documentation Status, Education, Decade, and City Dweller
All countries
%
  t-stat.
Variable
By documentation status
Legal
0.39
—
Unauthorized
0.41 −0.44
By educational attainment
Up to 15 years
0.20
—
16+ years
0.17
0.87
By decade of visit
During 1990s
0.30
—
2000 and later
0.28
0.83
By area where they stayed in the U.S.
Not a large city
0.44
—
Large city
0.34
2.91***

Costa Rica
%
t-stat.

Dominican
Republic
%
t-stat.

Haitia
%
t-stat.

Nicaragua
%
t-stat.

Perub
%
t-stat.

Mexico
%
t-stat.

0.41
0.96

—
−1.34

0.16
0.17

—
−0.12

—
—

—
—

0.21
0.31

—
−0.65

0.15
0.22

—
—

0.42
0.41

—
0.40

0.14
0.09

—
0.82

0.13
0.11

—
0.39

—
—

—
—

0.10
0.24

—
−1.41

0.19
0.06

—
1.75

0.23
0.18

—
1.07

0.28
0.46

—
−1.06

0.09
0.18

—
−2.02**

—
—

—
—

0.14
0.16

—
−0.36

0.03
0.13

—
−1.97*

0.31
0.28

—
1.34

0.61
0.22

—
1.28

0.22
0.14

—
1.29

0.19
0.11

—
1.75

0.25
0.17

—
0.83

—
—

—
—

0.44
0.36

—
2.34**

note: — = not available. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level
(two-tailed test). The hypothesis being tested is Ha: diff ≠ 0.
a
The limited number of observations for Haiti impedes a meaningful testing of statistically significant differences in most cases.
b
Information on migrant residency while in the United States is not available in the Peruvian survey.
Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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city while in the United States. Immigrants were more likely to remit
(73 percent versus 67 percent, Table 5.3) and to remit a larger fraction
of their monthly incomes (44 percent versus 34 percent, Table 5.4) if
they resided in smaller cities or rural areas. When distinguishing by
immigrants’ country of origin, the same pattern is observed, partially
as a result of the Mexican data being representative, to a large extent,
of agricultural migrant workers. However, the percentage of migrants
likely to remit in every country but Mexico (save Peru, where data are
unavailable) is larger among those who last resided in a large U.S. city.
This pattern may simply be indicative of the location preferences of
some of these countries’ emigrants: Dominicans may concentrate in
New York City, for example.
Whereas Tables 5.3 and 5.4 cover the percentage of remitters and
the magnitude of their remittance transfers by status, education, decade,
and rurality, Tables 5.5 and 5.6 display how the same characteristics
affect the purpose of funds remitted by immigrants. Perhaps the most
noticeable result from Table 5.5 is that remitting for consumption purposes is not only more prominent among less educated immigrants than
among more educated ones (43 versus 35 percent) but, in addition, it
has become the predominant remitting motive among immigrants over
the present decade (62 percent) as compared to the 1990s (43 percent).
This overall trend holds true among immigrants from Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Peru, and Mexico, but not among those from
Haiti and Nicaragua. Correspondingly, the data in Table 5.6 reveal how
asset accumulation has lost importance over time in the overall sample.
As a whole, asset accumulation appears to be a more prominent motive
among legal immigrants than among unauthorized ones. Likewise, less
educated Costa Ricans and Peruvians seem to cite asset accumulation as
a reason for remitting money home on more occasions than their more
educated counterparts. Finally, investment is more commonly a purpose
for transferring funds by immigrants residing in large U.S. cities during
their last trip, as is borne out by Costa Ricans and Mexicans.
In the following section, I take a look at households’ reporting of
these money inflows. I pay particular attention to the significance of
remittances in the family budget as well as to how households make use
of these money transfers.
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Table 5.5 Percentage of Migrants Declaring Consumption as the Purpose for Remitting Money Home, by
Documentation Status, Education, Decade, and City Dweller
All countries
%
t-stat.
Variable
By documentation status
Legal
0.78
—
Unauthorized
0.79
−0.78
By educational attainment
Up to 15 years 0.43
—
16+ years
0.35
2.20**
By decade of visit
During 1990s
0.43
—
2000 and later 0.62 −14.27***
By area where they stayed in the U.S.
Not a large city 0.79
—
Large city
0.79
−0.02

Costa Rica
%    t-stat.

Dominican
Republic
%   t-stat.

Haiti
%
t-stat.

Nicaragua
%    t-stat.

Perua
%    t-stat.

0.84
0.86

—
−0.23

0.89
1.00

—
−3.33***

0.82
1.00

—
−1.49

0.84
0.88

—
−0.32

0.73
1.00

0.39
0.33

—
0.32

0.57
0.64

—
−0.54

0.35
0.20

—
0.66

0.42
0.41

—
0.16

0.32
0.30

0.20
0.65

—
0.34
−7.86*** 0.72

—
−5.44***

0.12
0.09

—
0.37

0.27
0.06

—
0.06
−2.88*** 0.48

0.89
0.50

—
1.00
4.00*** 0.87

—
1.95**

0.71
1.00

—
−1.55

0.83
0.89

—
−0.69

—
—

%

Mexico
t-stat.

—
0.77
−2.81*** 0.79
—
0.16

—
−1.49

0.42
0.32

—
2.28***

—
0.46
−4.68*** 0.63

—
−11.81***

—
—

0.78
0.79

—
−0.27

note: — = not available. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level
(two-tailed test). The hypothesis being tested is Ha: diff ≠ 0.
a
Information on migrant residency while in the United States is not available in the Peruvian survey.
Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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All countries
%
  t-stat.
Variable
By documentation status
Legal
0.47
—
Unauthorized
0.43
2.12
By educational attainment
Up to 15 years
0.19
—
16+ years
0.13
2.40**
By decade of visit
During 1990s
0.29
—
2000 and later
0.24
4.44***
By area where they stayed in the U.S.
Not a large city
0.43
—
Large city
0.50 −4.62***

Costa Rica
%
  t-stat.

Dominican
Republic
%
   t-stat.

Haiti
%
t-stat.

Nicaragua
%
t-stat.

Perua
%
   t-stat.

Mexico
%
  t-stat.

0.17
0.11

—
0.91

0.07
0.00

—
2.73***

0.09
0.00

—
1.00

0.19
0.13

—
0.63

0.18
0.00

—
2.16**

0.49
0.48

—
0.94

0.15
0.00

—
3.23***

0.09
0.00

—
2.54***

0.09
0.00

—
1.45

0.11
0.05

—
1.02

0.11
0.05

—
0.76

0.23
0.21

—
0.63

—
−0.85

0.33
0.27

—
4.29***

—
—

0.45
0.53

—
−4.58***

0.05
0.11

—
−1.66*

0.03
0.04

—
−0.16

0.01
0.00

—
1.00

0.06
0.04

—
−0.36

0.02
0.06

0.11
0.50

—
−4.00***

0.00
0.09

—
−1.60

0.14
0.00

—
1.00

0.15
0.22

—
−0.79

—
—

note: — = not available. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level
(two-tailed test). The hypothesis being tested is Ha: diff ≠ 0.
a
Information on migrant residency while in the United States is not available in the Peruvian survey.
Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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Household Remittance Receipt and Actual Usage
In addition to measuring remittance transfers and examining the
motives behind immigrants’ remitting patterns, the literature has long
discussed how these money flows are used by migrants’ families back
home. This is of interest because immigrants’ purposes for transferring money may not always coincide with the reported use of funds
by the receiving families. In this regard, the MMP93 and LAMP ask
households whether they receive any money transfers from abroad and
whether these transfers represent a small, medium, or large portion of
family income. Additionally, households are questioned about whether
they use the reported funds for consumption or for asset accumulation
purposes. Summary data of these findings are displayed in Figure 5.5
and Table 5.7.
Approximately 2 percent of the 21,263 households interviewed
by the MMP93 and LAMP report receiving remittance transfers from
abroad.6 Table 5.7 displays slightly larger percentages of remittancereceiving households in Haiti (8 percent), the Dominican Republic (5
percent), and Costa Rica and Peru (both 3 percent) than in Nicaragua
and Mexico (2 percent). Overall, 47 percent of the households reporting on the magnitude of remittance income declare that these funds
constitute a large portion of household income (not shown). Separately,
the various countries report similar percentages. The exception is Haitian households, most of whom declare these funds to be of medium
size. Thus, dependence on remittance income may be a reality for some
families in these Latin American and Caribbean nations.
Does the ultimate usage of remittance income by families coincide
with the purpose for which immigrants transfer funds home? Figure
5.5 and the bottom category of Table 5.7 address the question of what
remittances are used for. Thirty-eight percent of remittance-receiving
households say they use remittance income for purchasing or adding
to existing property (Figure 5.5). This percentage mirrors the 38 percent of immigrants declaring property investment as one of the motives
for sending money back to their native country.7 A comparable figure
on the percentage of immigrants sending money back for consumption
is, unfortunately, not available since households are only asked about
the use of remittance income to purchase specific items, and only one
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Figure 5.5 Types of Investment by Remittance-Receiving Households (%)
Business (1)

Land (3)

Farm (3)
Livestock (4)

Property (38)

None (22)

Vehicles (29)

NOTE: Only 78 percent of households reported using remittances to purchase assets.
The remaining 22 percent (“None”) use remittances for consumption purposes.
Source: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.

of those items falls within the consumption category—vehicles, at 29
percent (Figure 5.5).
Large percentages of remittance-receiving households (Table 5.7)
declare using this income for asset accumulation purposes in Haiti (83
percent), Costa Rica (49 percent), the Dominican Republic (41 percent),
and Mexico (39 percent). Yet only in the case of Mexico is the percentage of receiving households declaring that they use remittances for asset accumulation approached by the percentage of immigrants declaring asset accumulation as one of the motives for sending money home,
as shown in Figure 5.4. In the other cases, households appear to be
using remittances to invest significantly more than is expected of them
by their remitting family members. Only 16 percent of Costa Rican
emigrants, 7 percent of Dominicans, and 7 percent of Haitians said they
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Table 5.7 Proportion of Household Income Made Up by Remittances, and What Remittances Are Used For
Dominican
Republic
%
N
51
0.05

Haiti
Nicaragua
%
%
Variable
N
N
% remittance-receiving
30
0.08
40
0.02
households
% of households declaring remittances to be a small, medium, or large part of their income
Costa Rica
%
N
39
0.03

Small
36
0.28
51
0.27
30
0.13
39
0.28
Medium
36
0.19
51
0.22
30
0.60
39
0.21
Large
36
0.53
51
0.51
30
0.27
39
0.51
% of households declaring that they use remittances to finance consumption or asset accumulation
Consumption (vehicles)a
39
0.26
51
0.33
30
0.53
40
0.15
Asset accumulation
39
0.49
51
0.41
30
0.83
40
0.13
Housing investments
39
0.41
51
0.37
30
0.80
40
0.13
Business
39
0.00
51
0.12
30
0.00
40
0.00
Land
39
0.10
51
0.00
30
0.00
40
0.03
Farm
39
0.13
51
0.02
30
0.00
40
0.03
Livestock
39
0.05
51
0.02
30
0.03
40
0.03

N
19

Peru
%
0.03

Mexico
%
N
264
0.02

19
19
19

0.26
0.16
0.58

264
264
264

0.40
0.13
0.47

19
19
19
19
19
19
19

0.26
0.32
0.32
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

264
264
264
264
264
264
264

0.28
0.39
0.37
0.00
0.04
0.03
0.05

a
The only specific form of consumption the survey asks about is the purchase of vehicles.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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sent money home for asset accumulation purposes. This pattern is also
observed among Peruvian households: 32 percent of remittance-receiving households in Peru use the remittances to purchase assets, whereas
only 17 percent of Peruvian remitters report sending money home for
asset accumulation purposes. In fact, only in Mexico and Nicaragua do
households engage in less asset accumulation than is expected from
remitters. In particular, 39 and 13 percent of Mexican and Nicaraguan
remittance-receiving households report using remittance income to
purchase assets, whereas 48 percent and 18 percent of Mexican and
Nicaraguan remitters indicate investment as one of the purposes for
transferring money home.
It is interesting to see how these funds are invested by country. In
Costa Rica, as in most countries, remittance income is most often used
to purchase housing investments (41 percent of remittance-receiving
households indicate this usage). Thirteen and 10 percent of remittancereceiving Costa Rican households indicate farms and land, respectively,
as secondary assets acquired with remittance income. In the Dominican
Republic, the primary use of remittance income is also for housing stock
acquisition (37 percent); however, for Dominicans business investments
are the second use for the transferred funds (12 percent of households).
In summary, the report from families does not support the notion that
remittances do not serve investment purposes. Rather, it shows that a
substantial percentage of households use the received money flows for
asset accumulation purposes.

Conclusion
This study explores the similarities and differences in migration and
remitting patterns of Latin Americans in the United States using data
from two comparable survey instruments, the Mexican Migration Project (MMP93) and the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP).
The data reveal that 68 percent of Latin American immigrants in
the sample—coming from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Peru, and Mexico—are unauthorized. About 75 percent of
these unauthorized immigrants rely on smuggling services to cross the
border, paying $427 on average. While immigrants’ reliance on smug-
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glers and the money paid for such services vary across countries (depending, in part, on the country’s proximity to the United States), smuggling costs have generally been on the rise for the past two decades.
As such, it is not surprising to find that immigrants who use cheaper
smuggling services cross the U.S. border more often than their counterparts who pay higher prices. Yet in some instances, such as with Costa
Ricans and Nicaraguans, higher smuggling costs seem to be justified by
a higher ratio of successful illegal border crossings.
About 70 percent of immigrants report that they remitted money
back home on a monthly basis during their last U.S. trip. On average,
migrants remitted $300 a month, or 40 percent of their earnings. These
figures vary significantly across countries, with Dominicans sending
an average of $179 a month, or 16 percent of their earnings, and Costa
Ricans sending as much as $493 a month, or 55 percent of their earnings. When we examine immigrants’ remitting motives, the data show
that consumption is the most important motive for sending money home
in the case of 79 percent of remitters. Consumption as the reason for remittance takes on greater importance for less educated immigrants or
those who came to the United States in 2000 or later. However, a considerable proportion of immigrants (45 percent) report asset accumulation as one of their motives for transferring money to their families.
Among Dominican, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Costa Rican remitters,
however, the importance of asset accumulation is significantly smaller,
never surpassing 18 percent.
Examining households’ remittance-receiving patterns and their usage of these money transfers, we see that about 45 percent of the 439
remittance-receiving households in the survey (2 percent of all households in the survey) report using these money transfers to purchase assets. As such, households appear to be investing remittances at a higher
rate than is expected of them by their remitting family members. Most
of the flows used for asset accumulation go toward acquiring property.
Secondarily, 10 and 13 percent of remittance-receiving households in
Costa Rica invest in land and farming, and 12 percent of such households in the Dominican Republic invest in business. In most instances,
remittances constitute a significant portion of household income, meaning that these families rely to some extent on these flows.
The analysis reveals the different migration and remitting practices
of Latin American emigrants as well as the diverse uses of remittance
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income by households, depending on the country. Given the mobility of
workers and capital flows in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is important to gain a better understanding of these country-level differences
and exploit them in the design of policies that maximize the economic
potential of money flows in improving the livelihood of their recipients
back home.

Notes
1. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP93) and the Latin American Migration
Project (LAMP) are collaborative research projects based at Princeton University and the University of Guadalajara, supported by the National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development (NICHD), Rockville, MD. The Web sites for
MMP93 and LAMP can be found at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu and http://lamp
.opr.princeton.edu.
			 The LAMP has also conducted research in Puerto Rico, Guatemala, and Paraguay. However, Guatemala and Paraguay were not included here because either
the data sets were too small or (in the case of Paraguay) a modified version of the
survey was used. Puerto Rico was omitted because of its link to the United States
(whereby its migrants are all legal).
2. The MMP93 sample covers communities in the states of Aguascalientes, Baja
California Norte, Chihuahua, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo,
Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Puebla, San Luis Potosí,
Sinaloa, and Zacatecas.
3. The MMP93 interviews were conducted in communities of various size, ethnic composition, and economic development in typical source regions for U.S.bound migrants. The sample has expanded over time to incorporate communities
in newer sending states.
4. This figure of 6,392 includes the 5,837 immigrants from the MMP93 study, mentioned above, plus 555 immigrants from the LAMP.
5. These averages are for all countries in the study and are not represented in Figure
5.3.
6. This percentage, undoubtedly driven by the prominence of Mexican data in our
joint sample, is close to the 5 percent of Mexican households who report receiving remittance transfers from abroad in the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y
Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH). The ENIGH is a representative Mexican household survey of income and expenditures carried out by the INEGI—the Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia, e Informática, or the Mexican National
Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo
2005).
7. The 38 percent figure represents the aggregation of the country-level averages
shown in Figure 5.4.
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6
Remittances in the Pacific
David J. McKenzie
Development Research Group, The World Bank

Small island states have among the highest rates of migration in
the world (Table 6.1).1 The average island country with a population
of under 1.5 million has 17 percent of all its citizens living overseas,
and several of these island nations have more than 30 percent of their
citizens abroad. Many of the Pacific Islands follow this pattern; for instance, approximately one-third of Samoa’s and Tonga’s populations
live in another country. Some of the smallest islands in the Pacific have
even more dramatic migration rates: more individuals born in Niue and
Tokelau now live in New Zealand than on either of these two islands.2
Together with high migration rates one finds heavy dependence on remittances in many of these countries.3 For the year 2004, Tonga, the
main subject of this chapter, had remittances equal to 39 percent of
GDP, the highest measured rate in the world.
The growing size of remittances around the world has led researchers to give renewed attention to their importance for development and
has prompted officials to engage in discussion of policies designed to
increase the benefits of migration (Global Commission on International
Migration 2005; World Bank 2005). One question that can arise in these
discussions is whether there is scope for countries such as Tonga, which
already receives large remittance flows, to further increase the benefits
from remittances. This chapter will use a recently conducted survey of
Tongan migrants in New Zealand, and of Tongans in Tonga, to argue
that there is still a sizable scope for policies designed to lower the costs
of sending money and improve the knowledge of migrants and their
families about remittance products.
The survey I use here collects much more detailed information on
remittance transactions than is commonly the case. I use this information to provide a description of some aspects of remittances that are
typically missed in standard surveys; these additional aspects have im-
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Table 6.1 Migration and Remittance Rates for Small Islands
Population
(000s)
Africa
Cape Verde
Comoros
Mauritius
Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles
Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda
Dominica
Grenada
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and Grenadines
Trinidad and Tobago
Pacific Islands
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Federated
States of
Palau
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Vanuatu
South Asia
Maldives

%
migrants

Remittances
(% GDP)

Main
destination

470
600
1,222
157
84

18.7
3.2
6.9
8.5
8.7

11.5
3.8
4.0
1.7
0.3

Portugal
France
France
Portugal
United Kingdom

79
71
195
47
161
109
1,313

28.9
32.0
23.8
38.5
17.5
31.1
18.8

1.5
1.6
5.3
1.1
0.6
0.8
0.8

United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States

835
96
53
125

13.5
2.4
13.0
12.2

1.1
12.0
—
—

Australia
United States
United States
United States

20
178
457
102
210

20.2
35.1
0.5
31.1
1.0

—
14.2
0.9
39.2
3.3

United States
New Zealand
Australia
New Zealand
Australia

293

0.8

0.4

India

NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Remittances and population from World Development Indicators central
database (August 2005 update); migration stocks and destinations from foreign-born
Version 4 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database in Parsons et al.
(2005).
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plications for the measurement of remittances. The survey also matches
a small sample of migrants in New Zealand to their family members remaining in Tonga, and both groups are interviewed. I conclude by using
this matched sample to look at how expectations for the continuation of
remittances differ between migrants and their families.

A Brief History of Tongan Migration to
New Zealand
The Kingdom of Tonga is an archipelago of islands in the South
Pacific, about two-thirds of the way from Hawaii to New Zealand.4
The population is just over 100,000, and more than 30,000 additional
Tongans live abroad (Table 6.1). Tongan migration to New Zealand really began in the 1960s and 1970s, when Tongans began arriving on
temporary permits to take up work opportunities. After their permits
expired, some returned to Tonga and others stayed on in New Zealand
illegally. An amnesty in 1976 granted many of these illegals permanent
residence.
Migration for work continued in the late 1970s and into the 1980s,
and by 1986 the Tongan population in New Zealand had reached 13,600.
In 1991 New Zealand introduced a points-based selection system for
immigration, in which potential migrants are awarded points for education, skills, and business capital. Few Tongans qualified to migrate
under this points system, so most Tongan migration during the 1990s
was under family-sponsored categories—as the spouse, parent, or child
of an existing migrant. For example, in fiscal year 1998, only 29 Tongans were admitted as principal applicants under the points system,
compared to 436 under family categories. With family migration, the
Tongan-born population in New Zealand had grown to 19,000 by the
2001 census.
In early 2002 another channel was opened up for immigration to
New Zealand, through the creation of the Pacific Access Category
(PAC), which allows for a quota of 250 Tongans to emigrate to New
Zealand each year. Applicants in this category must be between the ages
of 18 and 45, meet requirements for health, character, and a minimum
level of English-speaking ability, and have an offer of employment in
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New Zealand. It is the group of new migrants in this category that I
shall discuss.

Data
The main source of data I use is the Tongan component of the
Pacific Island–New Zealand Migration Survey (PINZMS), conducted
in the first half of 2005. The PINZMS uses a sample frame of applicants
in the Pacific Access Category. More individuals apply to migrate than
the quota allows, so a lottery is used to allocate visas among applicants.
A comparison of winners and losers in this lottery is a feature of other
works that use this survey to estimate the causal effect of migration
on a number of migration outcomes (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman
2006; Stillman, McKenzie, and Gibson 2006). In addition to sampling
migrants in New Zealand who come through the PAC, the survey includes a sample of applicants for the quota who remain in Tonga, a
sample of nonapplicants who live in the same villages as the applicants,
and a sample of remaining household members of the migrants in New
Zealand. The first round provides a sample of 65 migrant households
in New Zealand and 230 households in Tonga. Forty-five out of the 65
migrants in New Zealand left behind household members in Tonga, and
we were able to survey 28 of these remaining households.
The PINZMS is a multitopic, detailed survey designed to look at
many aspects of the migration process. Detailed modules on remittances are given to migrant households in New Zealand and to all households in Tonga. The survey collects information on remittances sent and
received by both groups, separates these into money and goods flows,
collects information on the channels used to send remittances, and asks
a number of questions about knowledge of remittance methods and expectations of future remittance patterns.5
I supplement the PINZMS survey with information on the cost of
sending remittances, gathered directly from remittance service providers. For this chapter, for comparison purposes, I have additionally collected information on the costs of sending from Australia to several
Pacific Island countries, and from the United States to a couple of small
Caribbean countries.6
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The high cost of remitting in the Pacific
There are two main financial costs involved in sending money
across borders.7 The first is the fee charged by the remittance-sending
company, which is usually fixed or a step function. For example, ANZ
and Westpac banks in New Zealand charge a fixed fee of NZ$25 to
send a telegraphic transfer (wire transfer) from a bank account in New
Zealand to a bank account in Tonga. Western Union charges a fixed fee
of NZ$20 in New Zealand to send to Tonga or Samoa, but it charges a
stepped fee in Australia: A$15 for amounts of A$75 or less, A$20 for
amounts of A$76–$300, and A$25 for amounts of A$301–$999.
This component of the cost is the one most easily seen by consumers. However, the second component of the cost is less transparent. In
addition to the fixed fee, remittance-sending companies typically make
money by offering migrants a less advantageous exchange rate than the
interbank rate. The exchange rate commission charged by the bank or
remittance-sending company can be calculated by the equation
(6.1) R =
		

100 × (Interbank Rate − Offered Rate)
.
Interbank Rate

For example, at the interbank rate,8 NZ$100 would buy 138.71
pa’anga. However, at the exchange rate offered by ANZ Bank, one
would instead receive 135.79 pa’anga (and also have to pay the fixed
fee). The exchange rate commission of 2.1 percent therefore represents
a loss of pa’anga compared to what one would receive at the interbank
rate. Figure 6.1 graphs the exchange rate commission from New Zealand and Australia to a number of different Pacific Island countries for
ANZ Bank telegraphic transfers and Western Union transactions. For
comparison purposes I also show rates from Australia to the United
States and New Zealand, and the Western Union rate from the United
States to Mexico, one of the world’s most competitive markets.
The figure shows a wide range of exchange rate commissions, from
just over 1 percent to nearly 12. The highest commission is charged by
Melie mei Langi, a church-run remittance channel for sending money
from New Zealand to Tonga. This channel charges an extremely low
fixed fee (NZ$5), which is attractive to those who send small amounts,
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Figure 6.1Figure
Exchange
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on Remittances
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NOTE: ANZ = ANZ Bank Telegraphic Transfer rate; WU = Western Union rate;
AUS = Australia; NZ = New Zealand; US = United States.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from supplementary data collected on remittance
costs.

even though they must pay a high exchange rate commission. Moreover, even between ANZ Bank and Western Union, it is not the case that
one company always offers the better rate: Western Union has a lower
rate to Samoa but higher rates to Tonga, for example.
Figure 6.2 plots the overall cost of remitting from New Zealand to
Tonga by different channels, expressing the cost as a percentage of the
amount remitted. The cheapest method by far is to use an ATM card:
migrants in New Zealand can give their relative a second card, which
can then be used to withdraw cash from the ATM for a fee of NZ$5–$8
for most banks. The other methods all have much higher fixed fees,
resulting in extremely high costs for remitting small amounts. For example, remitting NZ$100 (US$68) ends up costing 25–30 percent of the
amount remitted.
These high levels of costs are not atypical in the Pacific and are
higher than in many other regions of the world. Figure 6.3 shows that
the cost of sending from New Zealand to Tonga is very similar to that
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Figure 6.2: Remittance
from New
Zealand
Figure 6.2 Remittance
Costs from Costs
New Zealand
to Tonga
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by
Various
Means
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SOURCE: Adapted from Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua (2006).

of sending from Australia to other Pacific Island countries, and is higher
than sending from the United States to Mexico, and from the United
States to Grenada, another small island country. In Gibson, McKenzie,
and Rohorua (2006), we compare the cost of sending US$200 (NZ$294)
by way of different remittance channels around the world. The cost of
15–23 percent from New Zealand to Tonga is approximately twice the
average cost of sending from France, Germany, the United States or the
United Kingdom to a wide variety of destinations, including Pakistan,
Mozambique, Portugal, Greece, and the Philippines. This is not simply
a result of small economies of scale in Tonga, since Ghana and Mozambique, which receive the same total volume of remittances as Tonga,
have costs of 5 percent or less for sending this amount.
These high costs of sending money in the Pacific therefore suggest that there is room for policies aimed at lowering these costs. The
question that then arises is how sensitive remittance senders are to the
cost. We asked Tongan migrants in New Zealand how much they sent
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Figure 6.3  Comparison of Remittance Costs in the Pacific to those from
Figure 3:
Costs are high elsewhere in the Pacific too
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NOTE: Amounts shown are based on Western Union rates from Australia and Moneygram rates from the United States.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from supplementary data collected on remittance
costs.

in their last remittance transaction, the cost of sending this, and how
much they would have sent if fees had been only half as much. Based
on these answers, Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua (2006) estimate
that the average cost-elasticity of remittances is −0.22, so that when
costs fall, remitters will send more remittances. As an example, if the
cost of sending from New Zealand to Tonga were to fall to levels just
above those between the United States and Mexico, we calculate that
instead of sending NZ$200, remitters would send NZ$228, and receiving households would experience a 27.5 percent increase in the amount
of remittances received in local currency.9 Given the large share remittances already make up in household incomes, this is a sizable potential
gain.
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What can be done to reduce costs?
These high costs therefore do suggest that there is scope for increasing remittances, even in a country like Tonga, which already receives a
large amount. What, then, can be done to reduce remittance costs? The
World Bank’s (2005) recent Global Economic Prospects 2006 report on
remittances emphasizes three policies for lowering remittance transaction costs:
1) Promoting competition,
2) Improving access of migrants to the financial system, and
3) Disseminating information.
In the case of the Pacific, migrants do have a range of options available for sending money. The small size of these economies suggests
that there is likely to be a limit on the number of separate banks and
money transfer operators that can offer services. I therefore do not think
there is much scope for enhancing competition through further entry of
new remittance providers. All of the Tongan migrants we surveyed in
New Zealand who send remittances have bank accounts, and 98 percent
have ATM cards. Among the sample of households in Tonga, 79 percent
have bank accounts and 54 percent have ATM cards. ANZ and Westpac
banks both have four ATM locations in Tonga, and Western Union has
18 locations. There is thus some scope for expansion of access to financial services within Tonga, which would make it easier for migrants’
family members to receive remittances through direct bank transfers
and ATMs. As we saw, the ATM card transaction has by far the lowest
fee, so any expansion of this channel can potentially have a large effect
on reducing costs.
What would be the effect of information dissemination? The pricing
of remittance transactions is rather opaque, particularly with regard to
the exchange rate component. Phone calls to several of the nonbank remittance-sending companies were met with suspicion and, in some cases, refusal to provide information on the exchange rate or cost of sending without our visiting the office in person. Moreover, many migrants
are not aware of the size of the commission being charged, or of what
the interbank exchange rate actually is. We asked migrants in New Zealand and remittance receivers in Tonga what the New Zealand-to-Tonga
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exchange rate was. Figure 6.4 shows a histogram of the answers from
those in Tonga; the dual vertical lines show the Westpac/ANZ exchange
rate (left line) and the Interbank exchange rate (right line). Although the
exchange rate was stable over the survey period, the mean and median
exchange rate quoted by the Tongan remittance receivers both missed
the mark widely—they are around 120 pa’anga per NZ$100, which understates the true exchange rate (136 pa’anga per NZ$100) by about 12
percent. Similarly, among migrants sending remittances, the mean reported exchange rate was 122 pa’anga per NZ$100. Therefore, Tongans
displayed a wide lack of knowledge about the exchange rate whether
they were sending or receiving remittances—thus affording remittance
companies an opportunity to extract high commissions.
In addition to possessing incomplete information about the exchange
rate, many remittance senders and receivers have a limited knowledge
about the variety of different remittance-sending methods that are available. The PINZMS survey asked senders and receivers whether they
knew about particular methods and whether they had used them. Table
Figure 6.4: Tongans' estimates of the Tonga-New Zealand exchange rate
Figure 6.4 Tongans’
Estimates(Pa'anga
of theperNew
Zealand–Tonga Exchange
100 $NZ)
Rate (pa’anga per NZ$100)

30

Frequency (%)
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Estimated exchange rate (%)

NOTE: Left line marks the Westpac/ANZ exchange rate; right line shows where the
Interbank exchange rate falls.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from PINZMS (2007) data.
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6.2 shows that almost all remitters and remittees know about Western
Union and most have used it. Only about half of the remitters in New
Zealand know how to send bank transfers by means of various banks,
and much fewer than half actually do so. Melie mei Langi is known and
used by about half the migrants but is less well known among the receivers, who know more about Moneygram.10 Despite ATMs being the
cheapest method, only 2 percent know about sending money this way.
None of the respondents knew about iKobo.com, a low-cost Internetbased method for sending money.
Table 6.2 Knowledge and Use of Different Remittance Channels (%)
Remittance senders
Remittance
in New Zealand
receivers in Tonga
Channel
Know
Use
Know
Use
Friend or relative paying for airfare
6.8
2.9
Friend or relative bringing back
4.5
4.9
money on visit
Sending/receiving money through
13.6
4.4
family/friends visiting overseas
Sending/receiving money through
45.5
28.6
another person
Sending/receiving money through
9.1
2.3
1.5
0.5
my church
Traveler’s check
2.3
0.0
1.5
0.5
Bank transfer through ANZ
47.7
0.0
13.1
5.3
Bank transfer through Westpac
52.3
4.5
13.1
4.9
Bank transfer through another bank 38.6
2.3
8.7
1.5
Western Union
95.5
77.3
92.2
90.3
Travelex
6.8
6.8
1.5
1.0
Moneygram
6.8
2.3
46.6
43.7
Melie mei Langi
47.7
47.7
24.8
24.8
iKobo.com
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
ATM card or credit card from
2.3
2.3
2.4
1.0
relative
Sample size

49

49

206

206

NOTE: Knowledge of the first four categories was assumed.
SOURCE: PINZMS (2007).
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Thus, while competition does exist, and while migrants and their
families generally do have access to bank accounts, the ability of both
of these factors to help lower remittance costs seems to be hampered
by a lack of information. There appears to be a role for information dissemination in increasing the benefits of competition and allowing migrants to obtain lower costs. The relatively small size of migrant communities may act as a barrier to widespread advertising campaigns by
money transfer companies, and the time involved in researching their
options may make it hard for individual migrants to know whether or
not they are getting a good deal. This then suggests a role for community organizations or migrant news organizations, which could better
disseminate this information.11 Weekly newspapers that have as their
audience the Fijian, Tongan, and Samoan communities in New Zealand
could provide a listing of the fixed-cost exchange rate premium and the
amounts received from sending $NZ100 and $NZ200 by way of different mechanisms.

What does a richer remittance survey tell us
about remittances?
The second part of this chapter involves dimensions of remittances
that standard surveys and official statistics may not pick up very well.
Standard household income and expenditure surveys typically ask for
little detailed information about remittances. For example, the ENIGH
surveys in Mexico only report the annual value of remittances received
by households.12 Even more specialized migration surveys such as the
Mexican Migration Project (MMP93) and the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) only ask respondents for the average monthly
remittances sent and the purpose of these remittances.13 In contrast,
the PINZMS has 10 pages of questions on remittances and thus is
able to provide richer detail on some important aspects of remittance
transactions.
The first aspect of the various dimensions of remittance surveys that
I consider is what is being measured by remittances. Officially recorded remittances form a large share of GDP in many Pacific countries,
but they do not capture all of the remittance action occurring. First, as
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Figure 6.5 Ratio of Price of Durable Goods in Tonga to Price in
6.5: Ratio of Price in Tonga to Price in New Zealand
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SOURCE: Prices collected in New Zealand and Tonga in September 2005 for the
PINZMS (2007) data set.

seen in Table 6.2, a number of remittance transactions occur through
informal channels, such as sending money back with friends or family
visiting from overseas. Second, in addition to cash, migrants also remit
goods such as consumer durables. These can be particularly important
in small island economies where the supply of durable goods is limited
and prices are higher than in the migrant destinations. For the sample of
14 durable goods shown in Figure 6.5, the price in Tonga averages 1.7
times the price in New Zealand.
The PINZMS asked migrants separately about the remittances they
had sent as monetary transfers and the remittances sent in the form of
goods. On average, cash remittances accounted for 75 percent of total remittances sent and 63 percent of total remittances received by all
remittance receivers in Tonga (not just those receiving from the New
Zealand sample). Therefore surveys and official statistics that focus
solely on monetary transfers in the Pacific Islands are likely to miss
25–40 percent of remittance transactions. Goods remittances are also
important in other areas of the world, although more work elsewhere is
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needed to generalize this result to obtain an estimate of the undercount
of remittances at a world level.
Another understudied aspect of remittance transactions is reverse
flows. Migrants not only send cash and goods to family members back
home but also receive them from home. Twenty-two percent of the migrants who had sent remittances from New Zealand to Tonga had also
received remittances from Tonga. However, remittances received are
mostly in the form of goods rather than cash—on average, cash received
by migrants accounts for only 11 percent of the total remittances they
receive, whereas goods account for 89 percent. These goods often tend
to be handicrafts, food, and other goods that carry nostalgic value. On
average these goods equal 43 percent of the value of remittances sent by
the migrants in New Zealand, meaning that the net flow of remittances
is substantially smaller than the gross flow.14
The next aspect that a richer survey reveals is that many remittances do not come from former household members. Figure 6.6 uses the
sample of remittance receivers in Tonga to plot the share of remittances
received according to the sender’s relationship to the household head.
Both value shares and frequency shares are shown, in case one or two
very rich relatives are driving all of the value share results. Remittances
received by former household members who moved to New Zealand
through the Pacific Access Category (that is, PAC household members)
are the only remittances that we know for sure came from a former
household member. Spouses abroad are also almost certain to be former
household members, while children would have been household members at some stage but may have been living outside of the household
before migration. These three groups, however, together account for
only 34 percent of the value of remittances received and 21 percent of
the number of remittance transactions.
Parents of the head and spouse of the head may or may not have lived
with the household before migration. Siblings of the household head are
much more likely to send remittances than siblings of the spouse of the
head. However, it is likely that many of these brothers and sisters of
the head were not living in the household before migration. The largest
source of remittances is other relatives, such as cousins, uncles, aunts,
grandparents, and other extended family. This shows that the benefits
of a single individual migrating spread beyond the household he or she
was living in at the time, and that the extended family benefits from
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Figure 6.6 Sources from Whom Tongans Receive Remittances
value Shares (%)
Nonrelatives
0.4
Other
relatives
43.0

PAC household
member 15.8

Child
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Parent of
head 5.4
Parent of spouse 4.7
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Sibling of head 11.0

Frequency Shares (%)
Nonrelatives
0.4
Other
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57.0

PAC household
member 11.2
Child 7.0
Spouse
2.9
Parent of
head 5.8
Parent of
spouse 6.6
Sibling of head 7.4
Sibling of spouse 1.7

NOTE: Percentages in top chart do not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. In
the bottom chart, the term “Frequency Shares” refers to the share of the number of
transactions contributed by each category of remitter.
SOURCE: PINZMS (2007).
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these remittances as well. The mean remitter sends remittances to 1.25
distinct groups of people, and the mean remittance-receiving household
in Tonga receives remittances from 1.22 people. However, these means
are the result of a few individuals sending or receiving remittances to or
from three people—the median remitter only sends remittances to one
person, and the median remittee only receives remittances from one
person, just not necessarily a former household member.

Why might remittances be spent differently
from other forms of income?
The development impact of remittances depends on their sustainability and what remittances are spent on. Many studies have looked to
see if remittances are spent differently from other sources of income.
One reason remittances might be spent differently is that migrants send
remittances in response to specific events, or conditional on certain actions being taken. Remittance receivers in Tonga reported that 66 percent of all remittance transactions received were earmarked for a special purpose. The main purposes were the misinale (a once-a-year gift
made to the church [Puloka 2003]), which accounted for 33 percent
of special purpose remittances, 28 percent of payment of school fees,
and 14 percent of funeral expenses. Remittances received for funeral
expenses can be considered a form of insurance, and therefore will be
spent differently than an increase in general household income. Remittances sent for other special purposes will only alter spending patterns
compared to the same increase in household income if the conditions
placed on them are binding, or if the fact that they are received as remittances increases the cost of certain expenses. This might be the case for
misinale payments and schooling, if families receiving remittances are
expected to pay more.15
A second reason remittances may be spent differently than other
sources of income is that households view them as being more temporary in nature. Standard economic theory suggests that households will
save a larger fraction of transitory income (or invest it in schooling and
housing) than they would for permanent income. However, the crosssectional nature of existing remittance surveys provides us with little
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Table 6.3 Mean Expected Chance Of Remitting/Receiving Remittances
Remaining
Migrants
household
In 1 year’s time
79.6
78.1
In 5 years’ time
63.7
68.3
In 10 years’ time
31.5
36.9
SOURCE: PINZMS (2007).

information on how households expect remittances to vary over time,
and whether these expectations match those of the migrants.
Our survey asked migrants what they thought the percent chance
was that they would remit in 1 year’s time if they were still in New
Zealand. This was followed by similar questions for 5 and 10 years’
time. Similarly, the head of the household that the migrant had been a
part of was asked what he or she thought was the percent chance that the
migrant would remit in 1, 5, and 10 years’ time if the migrant was still
in New Zealand. We were able to match 28 migrants to their remaining
family members. Table 6.3 shows the average percent chance reported
for different periods. On average, migrants and their families have very
similar expectations: both have high expectations of remittances occurring 1 year out, but lower expectations of remittances occurring in 5 and
10 years. That is, many remittance receivers believe that remittances
will be a short-term source of income.
Not only does the average expectation of receiving remittances decline over time, but the expectation declines for almost every single
family. Figure 6.7 shows that families with higher expectations of receiving remittances in 1 year also have higher expectations of receiving
remittances in 5 and 10 years, but that the percent chance of receiving
is almost always less than the 1-year-out expectation.
However, although on average migrants and their families have
similar expectations, when we look at the matched pairs, a very different pattern arises. Figure 6.8 shows the match between migrant and
family expectations for remittances in 1 year and in 10 years. There is a
much looser relationship for expectations 1 year out than 10 years out:
the rank-order correlation is 0.27 for 1 year (insignificantly different
from zero) and 0.43 for 10 years (significantly different from zero at the
0.05 level). At 1 year out, there is a group of migrants who have very
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Expected chance of remitting in 5 and 10 years

Figure 6.7 Expectations of Receiving Remittances Decay over Time
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NOTE: The data consist of pairs of expectations, where an x,y pairing of (1-year expectation, 5-year expectation) is represented by one set of dots, and an x,y pairing of
(1-year expectation, 10-year expectation) is represented by another set of dots. The
45-degree line shows what the 5- and 10-year expectations would be if they were the
same as the 1-year expectations.
SOURCE: PINZMS (2007).

high expectations of remitting, but whose families have low expectations of receiving remittances, and another group whose families expect
remittances, but who don’t expect to be sending them.
This difference between the remittance expectations of migrants
and their families 1 year out may reflect uncertainty over how long it
will take the migrant to get settled in his new country and start earning sufficient income to send remittances. Regression of the difference
between the family’s expectations and the migrant’s expectations on
characteristics of the migrant finds the family to have higher expectations than the migrant when the migrant is currently unemployed, and
when the migrant states there is a high probability of losing his job in
the next year and a low probability of being employed in 1 year’s time.
However, these correlates are only suggestive; as with the small sample
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Figure 6.8 Relationship between Migrant and Family Expectations for
Remittances in 1 Year, 10 Years
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size of matched observations, no explanatory variables were significant
in the regression.16 In contrast, expectations are much more aligned 10
years out—this is sufficiently long enough for migrants to have become
established and to have found a good job.
Note that both migrants and their families have lower expectations
of remittances being sent in 10 years’ time than they do in one year’s
time. This decay in the probability of sending remittances suggests that
remittances are viewed as a transitory form of income, which suggests
that receiving households should save or invest a higher proportion of
the income received from remittances than they would from a wage
income that was higher by the same amount. Nevertheless, this does
not necessarily mean that the level of remittances received by Tonga
from this group of Tongan migrants will decay over time—it may be the
case that falling probabilities of remitting are accompanied by higher
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amounts sent when remittances actually do occur. Most existing studies
of remittance decay are cross-sectional in nature and thus not able to
capture these dynamic aspects.17

Conclusion
Migration and remittances are of large importance to a number of
Pacific Island nations. This chapter has attempted to show that even
though these countries currently receive a lot of remittances, there is
still scope for further remittance growth, because the high costs of sending money may discourage some remittance. Expansion of ATM services and provision of information on exchange rate commissions and
the remittance options available seem promising avenues for lowering
these costs.
I have also highlighted some aspects of remittances that may not
so easily be seen in traditional surveys. Remittances occur as goods as
well as cash, are often accompanied by sizable reverse flows, and, at
least in the case of the Pacific Islands, are sent to the extended family
in addition to direct household members. Matching migrants to their
remaining household members shows that both groups expect the likelihood of remittances occurring to decrease with the time spent overseas, and that there is more concurrence in expectations in the long term
than in the short term. These findings are drawn from a rather small
sample of matched migrants, and so in future research it will be useful
to see whether they hold for larger samples and for migrants from other
countries.

Notes
This chapter builds on surveys and joint work conducted with John Gibson and
Halahingano Rohorua. Thanks to John Gibson for useful comments.
1. Measurement of migration stocks and remittances received is poor in a number
of countries, so the numbers in Table 6.1 should be treated with caution.
2. The population of Niue is 1,761, yet 5,328 Niue-born citizens live in New Zealand; Tokelau’s population is 1,513, yet 1,662 Tokelau-born citizens live in New
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Zealand. These figures are according to the Government of Niue (2004) and Statistics New Zealand (2001a,b).
Connell and Brown (2005) provide a recent overview of remittances in Pacific
Island countries and discuss reasons why some of the relatively high-migration
islands receive small remittances.
This section is based on information from The World Factbook (CIA 2006) and
from Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand (Taumoefolau 2006).
The PINZMS data come from a survey conducted by the author. A Web site dedicated to reporting the findings of this survey is at http://www.pacificmigration
.ac.nz.
Costs of sending from New Zealand to Tonga were collected in March 2005, at
the time of the PINZMS survey (see Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua [2006]
for details). Costs of sending from Australia and the United States via Western
Union and Moneygram were collected in January 2006.
A third potential cost faced by the receiver is a charge for receiving remittances.
For example, Westpac Bank in Tonga charges a fee to receive a telegraphic transfer or deposit a bank draft. Western Union typically does not charge the recipient, although there may be a fee to notify the recipient if he or she is in a distant
location. A fourth cost that occurs in some areas of the world is the “float” or
overnight interest collected by remittance companies (World Bank 2005). This is
not a major element in the Pacific.
As obtained from http://www.oanda.com. The interbank rate is the market rate
used between banks for transactions of US$1 million or more. This is the “official rate” typically quoted in the media.
The percentage increase in remittances received in local currency is the combination of two factors: 1) for each New Zealand dollar of remittances sent, a
reduction in remittance costs leads to more Tongan pa’anga being received, and
2) senders in New Zealand also will send more New Zealand dollars when remittance costs fall. The 27.5 percent increase in local currency is the combination of
these two factors.
Note that the sample of receivers includes those receiving money from family
members who have migrated to New Zealand, Australia, and the United States
through other methods than the Pacific Access Category, the category that the
sample of migrants come from.
An alternative would be for the Pacific Island consulates to provide this service
for their migrants. Mexico’s consulates in the United States collect weekly data
on the costs of sending money from nine cities in the United States and publish
it on Mexico’s consumer protection Web site, http://www.profeco.gob.mx.
ENIGH stands for Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares, or the
National Survey of Household Incomes and Expenses.
See Amuedo-Dorantes (2005) and documentation on the MMP93 and LAMP Web
pages, found at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu and http://lamp.opr.princeton.edu,
respectively. The questionnaires are contained at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/
databases/ethnosurvey-en.aspx and http://lamp.opr.princeton.edu/documents-en
.aspx.
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14. This pattern of bidirectional remittance flows involving goods as well as cash
corresponds to findings of other remittance studies in the Pacific. See Connell
and Brown (2005) for a review.
15. This may be because families with migrants are expected to contribute more to
local public goods since having a migrant member is seen as a source of wealth,
as well as because migrant members planning on returning may be expected to
contribute to local public goods while away, so that the family merely acts as an
intermediary between the migrant and the community.
16. I also tried regressing the difference and the absolute difference in expectations
on age, education, sex, marital status, past income in Tonga, current income in
New Zealand, the difference in income, and the difference in employment status.
These variables were tried one by one, and also in groups. Current unemployment had the largest economic effect (associated with a 23 percent gap in expectations) and the highest t-statistic (1.4) in this regression.
17. Connell and Brown (2005) survey several studies of remittance decay in the
Pacific and conclude there is little statistically significant evidence for remittance decay. There are two main concerns with many of these cross-sectional
studies. The first is that they may rely on community networks to obtain a sample
of migrants, so that only migrants who remain tied to their communities (and
hence more likely to continue remitting) appear in the sample. If more recent
migrants are more likely to rely on membership of these ethnic networks, this
will result in a systematic bias against finding remittance decay. Second, these
studies are generally unable to control for return migration. If individuals who
are less successful in the migrant destination are more likely to return, then the
only migrants in the sample who have been in the host country for a long period
of time are successful migrants who can send large amounts of remittances.

References
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina. 2005. “Remittance Patterns of Latin American
and Caribbean Immigrants in the United States.” Paper presented at the
Werner Sichel Lecture-Seminar Series at Western Michigan University in
Kalamazoo, MI, October 12.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2006. The World Factbook. Washington,
DC: CIA. https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (accessed December 12, 2006).
Connell, John, and Richard P.C. Brown. 2005. “Remittances in the Pacific:
An Overview.” Asian Development Bank Pacific Studies Series. Manila,
Philippines: Asian Development Bank.
Gibson, John, David J. McKenzie, and Halahingano Rohorua. 2006. “How
Cost Elastic are Remittances? Estimates from Tongan Migrants in New
Zealand.” Pacific Economic Bulletin 21(1): 112–128.

Pozo Book.indb 120

4/18/2007 10:03:21 AM

Remittances in the Pacific 121
Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). 2005. Migration in
an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action. Report of the Global
Commission on International Migration. Geneva: GCIM. http://www.gcim
.org/attachements/gcim-complete-report-2005.pdf (accessed September 19,
2006).
Government of Niue. 2004. Niue Statistics. Economic Planning, Development
and Statistics Unit, Premier’s Department. Niue Island: Government of Niue.
http://www.spc.int/prism/country/nu/stats/NU_Publications/Population
_Estimates/Sept2004HeadCount.pdf (accessed January 3, 2007).
McKenzie, David J., John Gibson, and Steven Stillman. 2006. “How Important
is Selection? Experimental vs. Non-experimental Measures of the Income
Gains from Migration.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
3906. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Pacific Island–New Zealand Migration Survey (PINZMS). 2007. http://www
.pacificmigration.ac.nz.
Parsons, Christopher R., Ronald Skeldon, Terrie L. Walmsley, and L. Alan
Winters. 2005. “Quantifying the International Bilateral Movements of Migrants.” Working Paper T13. Brighton, UK: World Bank and the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the
University of Sussex.
Puloka, Tevita Tonga Mohenoa. 2003. “Theory and Practice of Misinale in the
Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga.” Brochure. Nashville, TN: General Board of
Discipleship, United Methodist Church. http://www.gbod.org/stewardship/
articles/tonga.pdf (accessed September 19, 2006).
Statistics New Zealand. 2001a. Niuean People in New Zealand. Pacific Profiles 2001. Wellington, NZ: Statistics New Zealand. http://www.stats.govt
.nz/analytical-reports/pacific-profiles/niuean/default.htm (accessed September 19, 2006).
———. 2001b. Tokelauan People in New Zealand. Pacific Profiles 2001.
Wellington, NZ: Statistics New Zealand. http://www.stats.govt.nz/
analytical-reports/pacific-profiles/tokelauan/default.htm (accessed September 19, 2006).
Stillman, Steven, David J. McKenzie, and John Gibson. 2006. “Migration and
Mental Health: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” BREAD Working
Paper No. 123. Cambridge, MA: Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of Development, Harvard University.
Taumoefolau, Melenaite. 2006. Tongans: Migrations. Te Manatu, Tonga:
Te Ara, the Encyclopedia of New Zealand. http://www.teara.govt.nz/
NewZealanders/NewZealandPeoples/Tongans/1/en (accessed December 12,
2006).
World Bank. 2005. Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications
of Remittances and Migration. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Pozo Book.indb 121

4/18/2007 10:03:21 AM

Pozo Book.indb 122

4/18/2007 10:03:21 AM

7
The Power of Home
Remittances to Families and Communities
Leah K. VanWey
Indiana University

The past two decades have seen a rapid increase in the value of
international migrant remittances; in 2005, their value worldwide conservatively was estimated at $167 billion per year (World Bank 2005).
In many cases, these remittances represent a substantial percentage of
a migrant-sending country’s income and overshadow the official development aid sent from other countries. This has led to research that
attempts to determine the effects of remittances on economic development; it has also led to government efforts to encourage the use of
remittances for development projects. The body of research is largely
inconclusive, as some studies show positive effects and some show that
remittances have no effect or negative effects on development. This
chapter makes the case that a more complete consideration of the different types of migration around the world, and of the role of social institutions in influencing motivations for remittances, can help us understand
these contradictory findings. I develop a typology of migration-remittance systems based on a consideration of social institutions, and I present examples of each type. I conclude with some thoughts about how
to construct a theory of the process linking migration and remittances
that will predict the future volume of remittances and their effects on
economic development.
Past research has focused less on this complete process and more
on either the motivations of individual migrants or the uses and effects
of remittances. The literature on remittances in the 1970s and 1980s
looks at remittances from temporary migrants to their wives, children,
and parents in their home communities (Dinerman 1978; Reichert
1981; Rempel and Lobdell 1978; Rubenstein 1992; Weist 1984). The
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migrants studied were primarily adult male heads of household who
had left their fellow household members behind in the home communities. Researchers in this tradition often focused on the ways in which
remittances were spent. They argued that migration was motivated by
a lack of employment or a low financial return to agriculture in home
communities. Migrants left in order to earn money to meet the family’s
current consumption needs. Therefore, virtually all of the remittances
were spent on consumption. These studies are largely pessimistic about
the potential for remittances to contribute to the economic development
of the home communities. In the words of Joshua Reichert (1981, p.
64), migration “actually serves to maintain (if not increase) the very
conditions of underdevelopment, underemployment, and unequal distribution of capital resources that make migration necessary in the first
place.”
In contrast, the 1990s and early 2000s saw the expansion of a more
nuanced approach to remittances, which largely followed the New
Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) approach to migration (Stark
1991; Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Lucas 1988; Taylor 1992, 1999;
Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw 2003). NELM sees migration as a response to market failures in developing countries and remittances as
part and parcel of the migration process. Migrants leave in large part in
order to generate remittances for their home households. The remittances allow the home households to meet consumption needs when other
income sources fail, and the remittances also provide them with cash
for large purchases. These remittances thus substitute for insurance,
smoothing consumption and allowing the home household to undertake
riskier agricultural endeavors. They substitute as well for credit markets, allowing the household to make investments that would otherwise
be impossible. Researchers in this tradition have, in particular, examined the effects of remittances by considering whole household budgets
rather than only considering the way the remittances themselves are
spent. Their research shows that remittances loosen household budget
constraints, allowing for productive investment as well as increases in
consumption (Taylor and Wyatt 1996).
Within this tradition, research has also challenged the pessimistic
view of the effects of remittances that are spent on consumption (Durand
et al. 1996; Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado
1994). Migrant-sending households use some of the remittances that

Pozo Book.indb 124

4/18/2007 10:03:21 AM

The Power of Home: Remittances to Families and Communities 125

are spent on consumption for purchase of local and regional products
and services. This spending then drives local and regional economic
growth by increasing demand for products and services. Estimates
of the multiplier effect of remittances—the amount that the economy
grows as a result of each dollar remitted—show the importance of remittances for economic growth in migrant-sending countries (Taylor
1999; Taylor et al. 1996; World Bank 2005). However, the effect of
remittances on home communities is less clear, as it depends on how
much of the spending of remittances goes for consumer goods from
elsewhere in the country or from the migration destinations.
At the same time, other researchers were focusing on individual
motivations for remittances, generally within a framework of comparing altruistic motivations to contractual (or exchange) motivations
(Agarwal and Horowitz 2002; Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 1985;
Secondi 1997; Stark 1999; Stark and Lucas 1988; VanWey 2004). This
research finds that remittance (and migration) patterns vary with the
individual characteristics of the migrant. The gender of the migrant, for
instance, has important implications for how much and what type of
remittance is sent (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; de la Brière et al.
2002; Osaki 1999; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2005; VanWey 2004).
The length of migration (Brown 1998) and the age and marital status of
the migrant also significantly affect the propensity to remit. While these
and other studies take the NELM approach of examining the reasons
for the decision to migrate, they also pay attention to the social and cultural context in order to understand who remits, when, and how much.
Social networks affect both the pressure to remit and the ability to remit
(Roberts and Morris 2003), while social norms influence the expectation by the migrant and the family that a particular type of migrant will
remit (Osaki 1999; VanWey 2004). This research also generates debate,
in this case about the motivations for remittances. Some studies find
support for altruistic motivations, while others find only support for
exchange motivations.
Since approximately the turn of the century researchers have been
examining a relatively new form of remittance, sometimes called “collective remittances” (Goldring 2004) and sometimes called “social remittances” (Alarcon 2002). These are remittances collected by a group
of migrants in a shared destination and returned to their home community for some sort of community project. These projects include
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social events (such as rodeos and festivals honoring patron saints),
infrastructure projects (paving roads, constructing or repairing buildings, installing sewer service), and scholarships for schoolchildren
(DeSipio 2002). These have been most extensively studied in modernday Mexico (Goldring 2004), but this form of remittance is also found
in other countries and other eras (Foner 2000; Mohan 2002; Mohan and
Zack-Williams 2002).
There are inconsistent findings about the causes and consequences
of this form of remittance as well. Cohen (2001) argues that migrants
provide these remittances in order to improve their social status in the
home community and not out of any altruistic motive. Others contend
that migrants are motivated by a concern for the welfare of their home
community and by a desire to give back to the community (de la Garza
and Lowell 2002). The Mexican government is banking on the second motivation and is encouraging migrants to act on it even more: the
government has begun a policy of providing matching funds for remittances sent back for community projects.
Even more vigorously debated is the effect of these projects on
community development. Binford (2003) argues that these community
projects do not always benefit the whole community, and that often the
projects are social in nature and thus have no lasting impact on the community. At the same time, others hold that these projects have positive
effects on their own and that they build capacity in the communities. By
organizing to complete a project, particularly one that requires interacting with the government to get matching funds, communities develop
organizational skills that were not present previously (Díaz-Briquets
and Pérez-López 1997; Vertovec 2004).
This chapter seeks to understand the reasons for some of the variation in results researchers have found concerning the motivations of
migrants to remit and the effects of remittances on economic development. I argue that social institutions in the home community and the
institutionalization of the migration process have important effects on
the economic actions of individual migrants. Migration and remittance
have traditionally been considered to be individual decisions, motivated
by economic concerns. Most simply put, individuals move to places
where they expect to make the most money over the long term (Massey
and García España 1987; Todaro 1969). Remittances belie the focus on
individuals by showing that migration can be a household or a family
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decision (Stark and Lucas 1988). However, this focus on individuals
versus households, with some additional consideration of economic
context, has led to contradictory arguments about motivations for remittances, about the levels of remittances to be expected, and about the
effects of remittances on development. Given the particular importance
of social institutions in influencing gendered family roles and migration (described in the next section), I propose a typology of migrationremittance systems that have distinct underlying rationales and effects
on economic development in the home community. In this chapter, I
argue that a more careful consideration of the type of migrants coming from a community (a factor that is based in some part on how well
developed migration streams are), and of the social institutions in that
community, will clarify some of the contradictions.

The Importance of Social Institutions
All migrants are someone’s child, spouse, or parent. The organization
of the family and the expectations of individuals filling various roles in
the family influence both migration and remittances. The expectations
regarding the behavior of individuals in various roles (parent, child,
spouse) are also determined by the gender expectations of the community (or country). The combination of gender and family position determines both the ability of an individual to migrate and the expectations
of support from any given individual to various others in the family. For
example, in many countries social rules indicate that unmarried daughters cannot work (or sometimes even travel) outside the home without
supervision by fathers or other male relatives. Often, social rules dictate
that one spouse cares for the home while the other provides financial or
subsistence support. Similarly, societies vary in the extent to which unmarried children old enough to migrate are expected to contribute domestic work or income to their parents’ household. Flows of money and
other forms of support from parents to married children or vice versa
are also structured by social norms, and strong norms of filial support
for aging parents are common in many high-migration societies. Such
norms are also gendered: social norms often indicate that support for
parents is provided by one particular child (e.g., the youngest daughter,
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the oldest son) or by one gender of child. Research shows that this often
leads to differential investment by parents, as parents give more support
to the child who is expected to later support them.
The institutions developed around the migration process itself also
have important implications for understanding remittances. As migration becomes more common in a community, the process becomes institutionalized, with widely known procedures and widespread opportunity for migration (Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1994). This leads both to
expansion of opportunity to migrate regardless of differences in wealth
and education and to more organization of migrants in the destination
areas. As the migration stream focuses on one or a few destinations and
the population of migrants from a common home community and having common experiences grows, migrants in destinations form organizations based on common home communities (hometown associations).
These associations then partially structure the way in which migrants
interact with their home communities, affecting the types, amounts, and
uses of remittances that they send.

A Typology of Migration-Remittance Systems
Because of the importance of the roles that migrants or potential
migrants play in their families, the typology I propose here focuses in
part on the changing types of migrants in terms of their family statuses.
The first type of migration-remittance system is a system in which the
majority of migrants are male heads of household, the traditional breadwinners in most migrant-sending societies. The second type of system
is one in which the majority of migrants are young adults leaving their
parents’ home to migrate before they have begun to form their own
families. The third is a system in which migration is widespread among
most types of people in a community. In this type, migration is common
enough that hometown associations have formed in the destination, and
exchanges of people, ideas, and money between home and destination
are common. In this next section, I describe the underlying logic of the
migration and remittance decisions for each type and then provide an
example of each system from past research.

Pozo Book.indb 128

4/18/2007 10:03:22 AM

The Power of Home: Remittances to Families and Communities 129

Migrant Male Heads of Household
The early research on international migrants and their remittances,
based largely on international migration from Mexico to the United
States, argued that men were leaving their wives and children in their
home communities in order to earn money to support them (Dinerman
1978; Massey et al. 1987; Reichert 1981; Weist 1984). These migrants
were characterized as target earners who came to the United States to
earn money because of a shortage of well-paying jobs in their home
communities. Once they earned the target amount—whether it be for
consumption for the next year, for a house, or for a piece of land—they
returned to their families. The logic underlying this type of migration
and remittance is simple: men in migrant-sending regions are unable to
earn enough money to start a family (which involves the purchase of
materials to build a house and the purchase of a piece of land to begin
farming) or to continue supporting their family (either through earning
a regular income or by investing in a new business or improvements to
their farm).
Migration is an attractive alternative because of the large amounts
(relative to the incomes in the home community) that can be earned
in relatively short periods of time. Migration becomes most attractive
when wages are low or unemployment is high in the home community
(Todaro 1969), but it also springs from a failure in certain key economic
markets (Stark and Bloom 1985). In particular, most migrant-sending
regions have no functional credit or insurance markets. Couples cannot buy a house on credit when they get married; they must have the
money in hand. Similarly, new farm machinery or inventory for a new
small business must be purchased with cash. Insurance against high
health care costs, the failure of crops, and unexpected unemployment is
similarly unavailable, making families vulnerable to a dramatic decline
in standard of living following these events. To overcome these market
failures, to get cash for planned or unplanned expenses, men migrate for
short periods to earn specified amounts of money.
The reasoning (based on the migrant’s gender-specific role in the
family) that motivates these men to both migrate and send (or bring)
remittances to their homes is the same reasoning that motivates them to
get any sort of job and spend the income on family needs. In Mexico,
the majority of migrants have traditionally been men because of norms
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about appropriate behavior for men and women. Men are expected to
support their families by working outside the home and bringing home
income. Thus, men not only are expected to earn income, but they have
greater freedom of movement outside of the home, making them the
clear choice for migration. Following this logic, it is also a foregone
conclusion that men will send or bring money home. They migrate
solely for the purpose of earning money, and they will be viewed as
having failed to support their families if they are not able to send or
bring money home.
Massey and colleagues provide clear descriptions of this type of migration from four communities in western Mexico in their book Return
to Aztlán (Massey et al. 1987) and in later works (Durand, Parrado, and
Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado 1994; Parrado 2004). They show
that the lifetime probability of migration is very high for men in their
study communities, the result of a predictable pattern of migration over
the lives of these men. Massey et al. (1987, p. 200) find that “active migration begins at a high level among young unmarried men, falls after
marriage, rises with the arrival of children, and then falls again as the
children mature and leave home. In short, over the course of a man’s
life cycle, active migration rises and falls depending on family needs,
while the number with migrant experience steadily grows.”
The level of migration varies from community to community, depending on economic conditions, but the pattern over the life cycle
holds across communities. Parrado (2004) finds that getting the money
necessary to set up an independent household is a strong motivator for
migration among young men. Massey and Parrado (1994) also find high
rates of remitting among migrant household heads (as opposed to unmarried migrants). Using an updated set of survey data covering 22
communities, they estimate that 73 percent of household heads remitted during their last trip to the United States (p. 11), while 58 percent
brought money back when they returned (p. 14).
Migrant Children
The second type of migration and remittance in my typology involves the migration of adult children out of their parents’ households
and their home communities. Like the first type, these moves are often
planned as temporary moves, in which children come to work in urban
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areas or international destinations for a short period of time between
stopping school and marrying. Thus the money that they send back is
sent to their parents rather than to spouses or children. This type of migration has been extensively studied in Southeast Asia (Elmhirst 2002;
Lauby and Stark 1988; Osaki 1999; Trager 1988; VanWey 2004) and in
Africa (Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 1985; Oberai and Singh 1980;
Stark and Lucas 1988), and it forms the basis for most of the theorizing
about the motivations of individuals to remit.
This type of migration decision follows a different logic from that
of the decision of male household heads. Theorists have argued that
the decision for these children to migrate is at least partly a household
decision, in which parents allocate themselves and their still-dependent
children to local or nonlocal employment in order to minimize risk and
smooth consumption (Massey et al. 1993; Stark and Lucas 1988). Thus
the expectation of remittances on the part of the home household is
an integral part of the migration decision. The home households are
generally in areas where they face imperfectly functioning or absent
markets, leading to a lack of affordable credit and to a lack of insurance
against crop failures or price fluctuations. By being employed off-farm,
migrants provide much-needed cash income for a variety of household
purchases. Migration also provides good insurance against income
shortfalls because migrants are generally in a geographic region or a
sector of the economy providing income that does not covary with the
income of the home household. For example, the failure of a rice crop
in a migrant-sending region of rural Thailand is generally unrelated to
the income earned by a migrant working in construction in Bangkok. If
the crop fails or rice prices drop and the home household cannot meet
consumption needs, the migrant will still have income that can be used
to support the family.
Even though home households send migrants with the expectation
of remittances to meet the needs of all household members, the results
of empirical studies of this type of migrant show that, at the same time,
migrants are self-interested actors (Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark
1985; Stark and Lucas 1988). Migration is important to young adults
for improving skills and long-term earning potential, and for meeting
new people and seeing new places. It can also be a way for migrants
to escape the control of their parents and home communities. Thus the
remittances that households receive from these migrants are not com-
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pletely unselfish. Research shows that home households and migrants
engage in informal bargaining, with migrants remitting more to the extent that they expect to benefit more from their relationships with their
home households.
The findings on remittances among these young adult migrants
closely mirror general studies and theories of intergenerational transfers
in the developing world. As in much of the literature on remittances, the
intergenerational transfers literature distinguishes between altruistic motivations on the part of children for supporting their parents (considering
the parents’ needs and sending support in response to those needs) and
exchange motivations, in which the transfers between generations are
part of a bargain that benefits both children and parents (Frankenberg,
Lillard, and Willis 2002; Lee, Parish, and Willis 1994; Lillard and Willis
1997; Quisumbing 1994). The support for altruistic motivations for remittances is relatively weak and shows that the “altruistic” behavior
of children is structured by social norms regarding filial responsibility—children that are expected to care for their aging parents are more
likely to behave altruistically than are other children. The literature on
remittances also shows clear self-interested behavior on the part of migrants who are children of aging parents: they remit more when they
expect to return to their home communities (Roberts and Morris 2003;
Sana 2005) or when their parents have more land that they may leave to
their children in the future (Hoddinott 1994; VanWey 2004).
My work on migrants from villages in rural Thailand provides a
good example of this type of remittance (VanWey 2004). This study examines migrants from a sample of villages in Nang Rong district, in the
Northeast of Thailand. The majority of the migrants are children leaving their parents’ home to migrate to other rural areas, to Bangkok, or
to export-oriented manufacturing areas in the Eastern Seaboard of the
country. I examine data from a 1994 follow-up survey, in which information was collected from each household about remittances over the
previous year from migrants who left the household between an earlier
interview (in 1984) and 1994. The relationships between migrants and
their home households are characterized by remittances in both directions, but migrants send money or goods home more often than home
households send money or goods to migrants. Figure 7.1 shows that
home households send some sort of remittance (money or goods) to just
under 20 percent of migrants, while more than half of male migrants
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Figure 7.1 Migrants and Households Remitting, Nang Rong, Thailand,
1994 (%)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Households

Male migrants

Female migrants

SOURCE: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Nang Rong Projects (University of North Carolina 2005).

and two-thirds of female migrants send some sort of remittance to their
home households.
From this figure we can see the gender differences in the probability
of remitting: women are much more likely to remit. Using multivariate
statistical models, I further explored the different determinants of remittances for male and female migrants. I found that both male and female
migrants were remitting in ways that suggested self-interested behavior.
The more land the home household owned (and therefore could leave to
the migrant in the future), the more likely an individual migrant was to
send remittances—but only when there were many other migrants from
the same household. The migrants were competing with each other for
the inheritance. However, female migrants were also acting in a way
that suggested altruism, by remitting at higher rates when their parents
were in the home household (as they were in most cases). They were
substantially more likely to be supporting those parents than were their
brothers.
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To test whether the differences between male and female migrants
in their overall rates of remitting were due to gender differences in
things like jobs or wealth of home households, or to differences in how
males and females made decisions based on jobs or wealth or the needs
of parents, I conducted a simulation analysis. I looked at what would
happen if men were like women, both in variables like age, occupation,
and education and in the characteristics of the households they left. I
then looked at what would happen if each gender had its true values in
these characteristics but behaved like the other gender. For example,
what if men had the same jobs or education but these characteristics
affected them in the way that they affected women? Figure 7.2 shows
the results of this analysis. The baseline difference between men and
women in remitting (shown in Figure 7.1) is due to differences in how
male and female migrants respond to various characteristics, primarily
to the presence of their parents in the home household. Even if men
were like women in age, education, etc. (bar C), they would not remit
Figure 7.2 Predicted Probability of Male and Female Migrants
Remitting, Nang Rong, Thailand, 1994
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Nang Rong Projects (University of North Carolina 2005).
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at the same rate as women. For that result to occur, they would have to
behave like women (bar B). Similarly, if women behaved like men (bar
C), they would remit less than they actually do (bar D).
These results show that migrants are behaving as we would expect
from the literature on intergenerational transfers and relationships. They
are bargaining (implicitly) with their parents and siblings for future inheritance of land, and daughters are fulfilling socially expected support
roles. In the Thai context, filial support is structured by the tenets of
Theravada Buddhism, which say that children must earn religious merit
on behalf of their parents to repay the parents for giving them life. Sons
are able to do this by spending a short period (about 3 months) becoming ordained monks during early adulthood, while daughters primarily earn religious merit by caring for their families. Thus, daughters
who migrate pay this debt through remittances while sons have no such
obligation.
Collective Remittances
While some anthropologists and others have noted the importance
of associations of migrants in destinations for migrant adaptation to
the destination community, and for economic development projects in
their home communities (Hirabayashi 1986), widespread study of the
remittances from these groups to their home communities has only recently begun (Alarcon 2002). This interest results from the dramatic
increase in the value of these remittances as international remittances
have grown in volume, and from the Mexican government’s attempt
to capture some of these remittances for infrastructure projects and
other development needs in home communities. Federal, state, and local governments in Mexico now provide matching funds (the amount
varies across the country but is usually a 100 or 200 percent match of
funds sent by migrant associations). This type of remittance becomes
more common as the size of the population of migrants from a given
hometown (or home region) in a destination grows. Migrant groups are
formed to aid migrants with adaptation and employment in the destination and for social reasons. These groups then collect money to send
home to their home communities for parties, infrastructure projects, or
other community needs. The extent to which the projects are initiated
or controlled by the home communities versus the migrant associations
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varies from community to community and is itself a function of institutions in the home community, as we will see in the example presented
below.
In this setting, the motivations for migration are similar to the previous cases, where migrants leave to earn more money and to overcome the lack of credit and insurance in home communities. However,
the longer history and institutionalization of migration has several impacts. The increasing participation of community members in migration
leads to migration being a less difficult choice. Migration costs less both
financially and psychologically because of three accumulative factors:
1) the ease of finding employment through friends, family, or the hometown association; 2) the familiarity of the people the migrant will find
in the destination; and 3) the number of people going back and forth.
Migrants now include not only spouses or children but entire nuclear
families. The hometown associations and organizations associated with
the migration process facilitate the migration and increase the affinity
that migrants have for home communities even in the absence of immediate family in the home community.
Remittances then take on a different set of motivations. Collective
remittances are fundamentally a social process, as they are collected
by an organization in the destination and sent for projects that benefit
more than one family in the home community. While migrants still send
money to their spouses or parents, they also send money through the
hometown associations for the betterment of the home community. The
hometown association’s stated motivation for this type of remittance
is care for the home community and a desire to improve the lives of
those remaining there. However, studies also show that the set of social
relationships among and between migrant and nonmigrant community
members structures remittance behavior. Migrants remit to increase
their social status among migrants and nonmigrants alike; indeed, the
dense network of social ties between migrants and nonmigrants in this
type of migration stream ensures that information is quickly transmitted
between these groups. Migrants also remit in order to increase the status
and access to resources of their extended family in the home community (Osili 2004), and in order to ensure their continued membership in
the community, which is called the option to return (Roberts and Morris
2003).
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An example of this type of remittance comes from a study that
VanWey, Tucker, and McConnell (2005) completed on remittances to
four communities in the central valleys of the state of Oaxaca, Mexico.
These communities are unusual for Mexico (though not for Oaxaca)
in their system of governance. The four communities are all managed
under a system called usos y costumbres, by which natural resources
are communally owned and all adult male community members have a
responsibility for the management of these resources and for the governance of the community. They contribute their labor for the maintenance
of communal resources (and community infrastructure) in the form of
workdays called tequio and must on a regular basis assume positions in
community government, called cargos, for a few years at a time. These
traditional (based on indigenous systems) governance institutions structure the collective remittances received by these communities.
Migrants from these communities are usually men traveling alone
or in groups (often leaving their wives and children in the home community) or nuclear families traveling together. Within Mexico, migrants
mostly travel to Oaxaca City or to Mexico City; in the United States,
they mostly travel to southern California. They migrate largely to obtain better-paying jobs in migration destinations, with the goal of improving their own and their families’ standards of living. Virtually all
of the migrants remit some money to family members, presumably for
the reasons described above (though we did not study this). However,
in some of the communities they also send money for missed tequios,
for community festivals, and for development projects initiated by the
origin community.
The primary motivation of these migrants for remitting is a desire
to maintain their position and membership in the home community. The
obligation to remit is framed as both a moral responsibility and a practical way to avoid adverse consequences for one’s remaining family
members. As a respondent in Sierra Alta notes, “Supposedly it [paying
for missed tequios] is voluntary, so it isn’t obligatory. More than anything, people here are very conscientious . . . We aren’t obligated, but
the majority of the migrants would feel bad to come back and not give
something . . . So it’s really a moral issue.”
The home community also uses the threat of restricting access to
services or to the benefits of communally owned resources to encourage payment. The president of the Committee on Communal Resources
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Table 7.1 Strength of Institutions, Migration, and Remittances for Study
Communities, Oaxaca, Mexico, 2002
Community
Sierra Alta
San Matias
Cerro Verde
San Timoteo

Strength of
institutions
High
High
Intermediate
Low

Migration to U.S.
Low
High
Low
High

Remittances to
community
High
High
Low
Low

SOURCE: Adapted from VanWey, Tucker, and McConnell (2005).

in San Timoteo, one of our study communities, reported, “In the end,
what the municipio opts to do is to await the moment in which it can lay
down the law. That moment comes when someone needs [the services
of] the commission. For example, someone says, ‘You have to put in a
water line.’ Well, we’re going to do it, but [I reply], ‘If you want water,
then you owe me five tequios that are worth this much, so you have to
pay that much.’ And that’s how we do it.”
This motivation explains the variation in the levels of remittance
we see sent to the different study communities. Table 7.1 shows the
results of our analyses of interview transcripts. The communities that
were more strongly organized under the usos y costumbres system,
with more clearly delineated responsibilities and strictly enforced fines,
also received more remittances from migrants. This was unrelated to
whether the migrants had gone to other parts of Mexico or to the United
States. Thus, stronger community institutions mean that the migrants
must remit in order to maintain their community membership and the
option of returning to the community.

The Power of Home and Its Implications for
Economic Development
These examples all show the importance of social institutions in
the home community and the home country in structuring the decisions
of migrants about remittances. That is to say, they all show the power of home over migrants. The rights and responsibilities of men and
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women, parents and children, determine their opportunities for migration and the amount and reasons they remit. The political institutions
in the home community determine the obligations that the migrant has
to the home community in order to guarantee the social standing of the
remaining family members and his or her own option for return. What
initially appears as an economic decision requires a consideration of
social institutions.
Given this, migration researchers need to account for these institutions in order to understand empirical results regarding the processes
of migration and remittance. Beyond that, we need to theorize on the
importance of social institutions. I have provided here a basic typology
from my work and that of others, but further theoretical work needs to
be done to develop the relationship that exists between migration, remittances, and a variety of social institutions, in order to move beyond
an after-the-fact interpretation of results as showing the institutional effects. This theoretical development will also show whether these three
categories of migration and remittance systems show the complete variability, or whether additional categories are needed. Furthermore, it will
allow us to develop and test hypotheses about the transition from one
migration-remittance system to another.
Understanding the effects of institutions and the type of migration
will allow us to understand and predict the effects of remittances on
economic development. The first type of migration and remittance (migrant male household heads) is essential for the well-being of families
in migrant-sending communities. However, it has a debatable impact
on economic development in sending communities. Many studies show
that the vast majority of the money brought home by these men, or sent
home to similar communities, is spent on current expenses or homes
(considered consumption expenses rather than productive investments).
Yet a review of studies by Taylor (1999) argues that even money spent
on consumption will have positive effects on the economy. Remittances
spent on consumption free up other resources for productive investment, according to studies of the effects of remittances on all types of
spending by households. Additionally, remittances spent on consumption in local communities represent a sizable amount of money and can
drive economic growth by increasing demand for locally or regionally produced goods and services (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996;
Taylor 1999; World Bank 2005).
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Remittances that are intergenerational transfers from migrant children to their parents have mixed implications for economic development. They go to parents to support their needs but are likely to come
at a time when the parents are not making investments in new land,
new technology, or other sorts of capital. The immediate use of these
remittances is more likely to be for consumption, but again this might
have multiplier effects. Thus, this type of remittance has the potential
to bring about economic growth as long as it lasts. The long-term impacts are limited by the lack of productive investment (meaning that the
remittances will not have long-term payoffs) and by the time-limited
nature of the remittances. Remittances that are used to support parents
will obviously not outlast the lives of the parents.
Collective remittances have the most immediate potential for positively affecting economic development. These monies can be used to
invest in infrastructure (roads, electricity, schools, sanitation, etc.) that
will improve the health and productivity of community residents and
potentially allow them to develop or attract businesses. While some
past research has suggested that collective remittances do not fund projects desired by the home community (as opposed to projects desired by
the migrants), our study shows that home communities can initiate projects and obtain money for them from migrants. In communities such as
our study communities, the money can be (and has been) invested in
community enterprises that bring additional income and employment to
community residents. In this way, remittances might be able to improve
home communities to such an extent that future migration would be less
desirable.
Further theoretical as well as empirical development of this migration-remittance system typology will allow researchers to predict
the future volume and effects of remittances on home communities. If
communities move in a rough progression from male heads of household being pioneer migrants to children migrating in a fully developed
multilocal social field that includes hometown associations and an institutionalized migration process, we can then predict a progression of
effects on local economic development. Initially this progression will
be characterized by relatively low levels of remittances (because of the
small number of migrants), and these remittances will be used for both
consumption and investment by nuclear families who are still rooted in
the community. These remittances not only will have multiplier effects
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because of consumption spending, but they will directly increase productivity by allowing investments of various types. Subsequent to this,
remittances to parents will be used primarily for consumption and will
only last as long as the parents are living and the children are obligated
to support them (for example, they might stop when the children themselves marry or have children). The economic effects of these remittances will occur primarily through consumption spending and multiplier effects. The volume of these remittances may also be higher, given
the larger number of migrants participating in the migration stream over
time. Finally, the remittances within the fully developed system bypass
(or supplement) remittances to families in their economic effects. The
fundamental change at this stage in the progression is that the remittances support the production of public goods, which benefits families
with and without migrants. This type of remittance has the possibility of
eventually evening the standards of living and the life chances of these
two groups.

Note
Parts of this chapter are based on empirical work conducted with Catherine Tucker and
Eileen McConnell, funded in part by the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change and by the College of Arts and Sciences at Indiana
University. Other parts are based on dissertation work conducted with support from the
Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (through
a National Institute for Child Health and Human Development training grant). The
author also thanks Jorge Chapa, Dennis Conway, Richard Jones, Enrico Marcelli, Una
Osili, Susan Pozo, and participants in a miniconference on transnational connectedness
at Indiana University, April 2006, for comments on earlier versions of this work.
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